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iiiForeword
Foreword
Despite strict regulations on the import, export, 
ownership, use, transfer and storage of licit firearms, 
there exists in Australia a potentially large pool of 
illicit firearms, some of which are acquired, stockpiled 
and used for serious and organised crime. The 
composition of this pool, the sources of these illicit 
firearms and the general sustainability of the illicit 
firearm market, however, remains a largely unexplored 
subject in Australia, outside of knowledge that is 
generated through intelligence. A series of drive-by 
and other shooting events in a number of Australian 
states since 2011 refocused attention on the illicit 
firearm market, in particular its consumers and the 
methods by which firearms were being trafficked.
This report follows a modest group of publicly 
released examinations of firearm trafficking operations 
in Australia, to describe what can be determined 
about the composition and maintenance of the illicit 
firearm market, its use by serious and organised 
crime groups and the diversity of transaction 
arrangements used to vend illicit firearms. As the 
report was limited to open source material, some of 
the nuances of, or emerging trends in, the illicit firearm 
trade are still to be drawn out. However, the report 
presents, using data on unregistered firearm seized 
by Australian state and territory police, a fuller picture 
of the type of firearms that serious and organised 
crime groups are actively obtaining and the common 
routes of supply from the licit to the illicit market.
Australia’s strict firearm laws permit only controlled 
access to handguns and automatic and semi-
automatic long-arms. Hence, restricted models are 
commonly elevated to items of choice. Just under 
half of firearms found in the possession of serious 
and organised crime groups were models that were 
the subject of buybacks that accompanied the major 
firearms agreements in 1996 and 2002. The majority 
of these were semi-automatic rifles and semi-
automatic pistols, supplemented by smaller 
quantities of pump-action shotguns, revolvers, 
semi-automatic shotguns, submachine guns and 
single shot pistols. Many of these restricted firearms 
were seized from entities involved in the illicit drug 
market and/or firearm trafficking ventures, or from 
members of outlaw motorcycle gangs—a criminal 
fraternity commonly connected to the sale and 
purchase of illicit firearms. Not all illicit firearms,  
of course, are purchased by persons engaged  
in serous and organised crime, and this group of 
consumers and their engagement with illicit firearms 
is worth further examination.
The tenure of firearms in the illicit market is not well 
understood, although the methods of diversion are. 
Illicit importation, diversion by some corrupt firearm 
dealers, deactivation loopholes (which enabled the 
diversion of poorly deactivated handguns out of the 
licit market), theft of legally owned firearms and the 
‘grey market’ (ie long-arms that were not surrendered 
during the 1996 gun buyback but are not conveyed 
for criminal purposes) all represent legitimate 
sources of trafficked firearms. There has been some 
contention about the importance of these sources. 
Analysis conducted for this report suggested that 
the ‘grey market’ was the primary source for illicit 
long-arms, while many illicit handguns originated 
from theft and the Queensland deactivation loophole.
The completeness of the data used for the report 
requires the addition of caveats about the need  
to use care in interpreting the presented findings. 
Data, along with intelligence, play a crucial role in 
understanding the dynamics of firearm trafficking. 
Since the 1996 and 2002 firearm reforms, important 
steps have been made in the collection of firearm 
data in Australia. Further changes to improve the 
standardisation and harmonisation of these data will 
deliver the ‘cradle to grave’ benchmark crucial for 
accurately tracing firearms, and consequently the 
means to support targeted enforcement responses.
Adam Tomison 
Director
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ixExecutive summary
The size and composition of the illicit firearm market 
in Australia, and the methods by which firearms  
are trafficked, have been the subject of conjecture. 
This conjecture is born from the complexity of illicit 
firearm markets in general (Pierce et al. 2004), as 
well as limited open-source information on firearm 
supply networks. This report follows earlier, briefer 
studies of firearm trafficking (Alpers & Twyford 2003; 
Kerlatec 2007; Mouzos 1999) and was designed  
to describe more fully the characteristics of the illicit 
firearms market in Australia and its association with 
serious and organised crime groups (SOCG). 
Specifically it describes:
•	 the composition of the illicit firearm market, 
including the types of firearms commonly found  
in the possession of SOCG;
•	 the supply routes by which firearms are diverted, 
or are otherwise transferred, from the licit to the 
illicit market with a focus on restricted long-arms 
and handguns; and
•	 the legislative, procedural and technological 
systems that have facilitated (and may continue  
to facilitate) the diversion of firearms.
The aim was also to identify where improvements 
could be made in the tracing of firearms to better 
understand the nature and dynamics of both the licit 
and illicit market.
The project was undertaken by the Australian 
Institute of Criminology (AIC) in collaboration with  
the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), and funded under 
the Research Support for National Security Program, 
which up until 2012 was administered by the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.  
It involved:
•	 a review of open-source literature and court 
proceedings to provide an overview of the types 
of firearm markets that operate in Australia; the 
types and known (or suspected) sources of illicit 
firearms; and the characteristics of participants 
(sellers and consumers) in the market;
•	 a review of Australian firearm laws to identify 
where legislative loopholes have been closed  
and where gaps that may facilitate diversion of 
firearms from the licit to the illicit market still exist;
•	 an examination of methods and systems for 
recording firearm data in Australia to illustrate 
where improvements could be made to enhance 
firearm tracing; and
•	 analysis of data compiled in the ACC’s National 
Firearm Trace Database, which contains records 
of some of the unregistered firearms seized by 
federal, state and territory police, to describe the 
composition of, and major sources of supply to, 
the illicit firearm market.
Legislative provisions
Australia’s firearm laws underwent extensive revision 
in response to the recommendations set by the  
then Australian Police Ministers Council (APMC)  
and Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 
the National Firearms Agreement (1996), National 
Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) and 
National Handgun Control Agreement (2002). These 
revisions aimed to consolidate firearm legislation in 
the states and territories (which have responsibility 
for the regulation of the use, possession and sale of 
firearms), and included the creation of new offences, 
or an increase in penalties for existing offences. The 
changes to offence provisions that were relevant to 
deterring firearms trafficking included:
•	 unauthorised possession, use, sale and disposal 
of a firearm;
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•	 trafficking in firearms;
•	 unauthorised manufacture of firearms and firearm 
parts;
•	 unauthorised modification of a firearm;
•	 defacement or alteration of a firearm’s 
identification marks; and
•	 wilfully making false entries in dealer records  
and employing prohibited persons in dealerships.
The reforms also influenced the introduction of new 
provisions on the import and export of restricted 
(prohibited) firearms and handguns and the creation 
of two new offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth) (Division 360 Part 9.4) concerning the illegal 
disposal or acquisition of firearms across a state/
territory border.
A 2008 AIC review of Australian state and territory 
firearm legislation found that jurisdictions had 
substantially complied with these resolutions  
(Davies & Mouzos 2008) and a subsequent review 
undertaken for this report showed that further 
refinements had been made to correct the legislative 
inconsistency that had existed in the past. However, 
a number of legislative loopholes were identified 
post-reform as being responsible for, or facilitating, 
the diversion of firearms from the licit to the illicit 
market. The most significant of these was the 
deactivation loophole in Queensland, whereby 
dealers and owners exploited a loophole in the 
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) regarding the ‘accountable’ 
(ie registrable) status of deactivated handguns, in 
order to reactivate poorly deactivated handguns and 
reportedly to move thousands of them into the illicit 
market (Project stakeholder personal communication 
24 September 2010).
An examination of the current legislation shows  
that inter-jurisdictional inconsistency, where it exists, 
is mostly localised, in that one or two states or 
territories have failed to incorporate amendments as 
they have been adopted elsewhere. It is difficult to 
rate the significance of these inconsistencies, yet it is 
likely that those with a comprehensive understanding 
of the legislation will continue to search for such 
inconsistences or gaps and test them for weakness 
(Project stakeholder personal communication  
4 May 2011). Areas where legislative accord could 
be improved concerns scrutiny around sale and 
disposal records maintained by dealers, and 
specifically, increasing penalties on the wilful entry of 
false information. Diversion by the recording of false 
information has contributed to the trafficking of 
firearms in the past (see section on Data analysis). 
There is also a need to offset issues around 
vulnerabilities of firearm parts, as opposed to full 
firearms, in the illicit trade, particularly if there is an 
increase in illicit domestic manufacture. Some further 
standardisation across the state and territory firearms 
laws as to what constitutes a major firearm part or 
component for the purposes of regulation may be 
warranted to prevent instances of firearms being 
manufactured using non-registrable parts.
Characteristics of  
firearm trafficking
There are three primary firearm markets in Australia. 
The licit market comprises all firearms that are 
subject to registration and held by a person with  
the approved authority to do so. The grey market 
consists of all long-arms that were not registered,  
or surrendered as required during the gun buybacks, 
following the National Firearms Agreement (1996). 
Grey market firearms are not owned, used or 
conveyed for criminal purposes but may end up in 
the illicit market. Illicit market firearms are those that 
were illegally imported into or illegally manufactured 
in Australia, diverted from the licit market or moved 
from the grey market.
It is not possible to estimate the size of the illicit 
market. Describing the likely composition of illicit 
stock is, however, a more realistic objective. This 
study used data on some of the unregistered 
firearms seized by state and territory police, 
compiled in the ACC’s National Firearm Trace 
Database, to quantify the types of firearms seized 
from SOCG, and as a comparison, persons or 
groups determined not to be involved in organised 
crime.
A high proportion of firearms seized from SOCG were 
restricted (alternatively referred to in the legislation as 
prescribed or prohibited) models—47 percent of all 
firearms recovered from entities involved in serious 
and organised crime were subject to either the  
1996 long-arm or 2003 handgun buybacks. Seventy 
percent (n=368) of all restricted long-arms were 
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seized from SOCG, as were 68 percent (n=431) of 
restricted handguns. Semi-automatic rifles were the 
most common restricted long-arm recovered from 
SOCG, accounting for 69 percent (n=253) of all 
restricted long-arms. Semi-automatic pistols were 
the most common handgun item (72% (n=311) of  
all restricted handguns), for reasons likely related to 
their ease of concealment, capacity to quickly reload 
and (for some models) a large magazine capacity (up 
to 10–13 rounds).
Restricted long-arms and handguns were not as 
common among non SOCG-related seizures but still 
made up a sizeable proportion of firearms located. 
Indeed, the prevalence of restricted handguns as a 
proportion of all handguns seized for each of the two 
groups considered was the same for SOCG seizures 
(67%) as it was for non-SOCG seizures (65%). The 
preference for restricted handguns among persons 
not associated with serious and organised crime  
is probably, in many cases, an acquisition to fulfil  
a curiosity rather than a criminal need. Historically 
stricter regulations around handgun use, and legal 
ownership dependent on the granting of formal 
membership to a pistol club, would have barred 
some enthusiasts from acquiring a handgun. The 
more determined ones may have then looked to  
the illicit market to satisfy this aspiration.
Overall, the trafficking network is not considered  
to be overly organised in structure, but largely 
dominated by serious and organised criminal entities 
(such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs)) who 
traffic illicit firearms as a side venture and smaller 
operators, who move firearms around by word of 
mouth (ACC 2011; Alpers & Twyford 2003; Kerlatec 
2007; Mouzos 1999; Qld CMC 2004). An examination 
of court appeal proceedings for persons charged 
with trafficking or other relevant firearm offences 
from the last 10 years distinguished two categories 
of suppliers—more committed operators who relied 
on the trafficking of firearms as a regular or primary 
source of income (and generally had access to  
a larger supply of sale items, including illegally 
manufactured firearms) and part-time vendors, who 
sold illicit firearms on a more ad hoc basis, often to 
support a drug habit or as a minor side business to 
their main occupation of dealing in illicit drugs.
The supply lines to the illicit market also consist of a 
mix of organised and opportunistic transferral. Illegal 
importation, theft, illicit manufacture, some corrupt 
dealers, legacy legislative loopholes and interstate 
transfer are all recognised methods of supply to  
the illicit firearm market (ACC 2009; Kerlatec 1999: 
Mouzos 1999; Qld CMC 2004) but the importance 
of these, historically and in the present time, is 
disputed. From the analysis of the aforementioned 
seizure data, it was evident that the grey market  
was the predominant source of long-arms to the 
illicit market—it accounted for 92 percent of all 
restricted long-arms and 86 percent of all non-
restricted long-arms. Theft or loss contributed to  
12 percent of non-restricted long-arms entering the 
market and just four percent of restricted models. 
The grey market is likely to continue as a legitimate 
source of long-arms to the illicit market but this 
all-capturing reservoir, which inadvertently emerged 
from the 1996 firearm reforms, potentially masks 
where diversion or other illegal methods of supply 
have actually occurred.
There is better differentiation of the methods used  
to traffic illicit handguns but issues around the quality 
of the data qualify the strength of the findings. Based 
on the available information, the deactivation loophole 
was an important contributor to the illicit handgun 
market, identified as the source for 39 percent  
of restricted handguns and 21 percent of non-
restricted handguns. Theft has been just as 
important a source. Half of all non-restricted 
handguns seized by state and territory police  
(where information was available) were stolen items, 
as were 31 percent of restricted handguns. The  
data indicated that illegal importation, however, has 
played a minor role (despite predictions elsewhere) 
and illicit domestic manufacture contributed to 
around one in 10 of both restricted and non-
restricted handguns entering the market. These 
findings, however, need to be treated with caution 
due to the large number of cases (70%) that had 
unknown information on the diversion pathway.
Tracing firearms
These data give an indication of historically important 
supply routes (the deactivation loophole being a 
relevant example) but are possibly less reliable in 
predicting future patterns of supply. Further, the 
issues of data completeness that affected many 
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variables in the dataset mean that that there are 
limitations to some of the findings, in particular the 
source of illicit handguns. Firearm data are recorded 
across numerous sites, including police administered 
firearm registers, material inventories, ballistic library 
inventories and firearms in police possession 
records, such as:
•	 the Integrated Cargo System, Firearms Tracking 
System and Detained Goods Management 
System operated by the Australian Customs  
and Border Protection Service (ACBPS);
•	 the Defence Export Control System administered 
by the Defence Export Control Office; and
•	 the National Firearms and Licensing Registration 
System (NFLRS) administered by CrimTrac.
A recommendation from the National Firearms 
Agreement (1996) was not only to establish an 
integrated licence and firearm registration system  
in each jurisdiction but to promote the collation and 
exchange of data between jurisdictions. This is also 
a provision outlined in the 2001 United Nations 
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components 
and Ammunition (UNGA 2001).
The original and existing model stemming from  
this particular National Firearms Agreement (1996) 
recommendation is the abovementioned NFLRS, but 
considerations (and actions) have since been made 
to improve and expand on this concept to better 
facilitate and simplify current capacities to trace the 
movement of firearms. However, the establishment 
of an all-encompassing National Firearms 
Management System (NFMS) or its equivalent, 
through which an array of relevant data custodians 
can upload, update and trace information on 
individual firearms and track individual firearms  
using a shared authoritative identity record, is still  
to be realised.
To ensure an NFMS operates well, attention must 
also be drawn to improving the recording of firearm 
data. Tracing firearms through an integrated system 
will be compromised if fundamental identification 
data are not recorded accurately or recorded in a 
myriad of formats. Correct initial capture data on 
serial number (the ‘fingerprints’ of a firearm) and 
other identifying markers are paramount to the 
efficacy of a system such as NFMS, as is conformity 
to the standardisation of terms. Discussion with 
stakeholders to the project indicated that these 
fundamentals continue to plague the accurate 
capture of firearm data, because persons involved  
in data recording do not always have the technical 
expertise for firearm identification procedures and/or 
previous and current data capture systems have 
permitted the entry of inconsistent (often wrong) 
information which cannot necessarily be validated 
post-entry.
In its most complete sense, firearm tracing refers  
to the tracking of a firearm from ‘cradle to grave’, 
recording different stages in the tenure of a firearm’s 
legal custodianship (eg manufacture, import, sale, 
deactivation, lawful export). When firearm data are 
captured consistently and comprehensively, they can 
be used to denote where firearms have been lost  
to the system and to recognise preferences in the 
types of items being transferred out of the licit 
market and the methods by which they are diverted. 
Data-recording practices (mostly in the past) have 
however, resulted in certain data useful or critical  
to firearm tracing being captured only recently,  
being captured inconsistently or not being captured 
at all. Implementing the suggested improvements  
to both the recording and dissemination of firearm 
data has the potential to assist law enforcement in 
identifying and disrupting the flow of firearms into  
the illicit market and refine targeting of enforcement 
activity.
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Introduction
Firearm trafficking in its most general sense, and as 
defined in the United Nations Protocol against the 
Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, 
Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, refers 
to the unauthorised ‘…import, export, acquisition, 
sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their 
parts and components and ammunition…’ across 
internal or state borders (UNGA 2001: 4). The  
term trafficking can also be used to designate the 
‘intentional diversion of (firearms) from legal to illegal 
commerce’ (Wright, Wintermute & Webster 2010: 
353), without involving the movement of item(s) 
across a physical border.
Tied to the venture of firearm trafficking is illicit 
manufacture which, according to the UN Protocol, 
incorporates the ‘manufacture or assembly of 
firearms, firearm parts and components or 
ammunition’ from illicitly produced parts and 
components and/or without the appropriate 
authorisation (UNGA 2001: 3–4). The Protocol  
(as per Article 8) also recognises a firearm as illicitly 
manufactured if, at the time of manufacture, it was 
not given a unique mark that enables it to be 
identified and traced.
Despite strict regulations on the import, export, 
ownership, use, transfer and storage of licit firearms, 
there exists in Australia a potentially large pool of 
illicit firearms, some of which are acquired, 
stockpiled and used in organised crime. Calculating 
the size of this illicit pool has proved impracticable, 
not least because even verifying the number and 
type of legal firearms in Australia was not possible 
until the late 1990s with the implementation of 
compulsory registration schemes for all firearms. It 
has also remained unclear to what extent the current 
illicit pool requires replenishment and is serviced  
by the movement of firearms from the licit market. 
These aspects of the Australian illicit firearms market 
will, most likely, continue to evade estimation, yet 
other features of the market, such as:
•	 firearm composition and preferences;
•	 the methods by which illicit firearms are sourced;
•	 the patterns of reliance on these methods and 
their future sustainability; and
•	 the legislative, law enforcement and procedural 
environment that impede (or in some cases, 
facilitate) the illegal trade in firearms.
All represent equally crucial and importantly, more 
feasibly examined elements of inquiry. It is these 
features of firearm trafficking, its operation in 
Australia and the connection with serious and 
organised crime, that will form the basis of the 
research presented in this report.
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Aims
In this study, an examination is undertaken into 
legislative, procedural and technological systems 
related to firearm registration and tracing in order to 
identify loopholes and gaps that facilitated and may 
continue to facilitate the diversion of firearms, firearm 
parts and ammunition into the illegal market. 
Investigation is also made of the extent to which 
SOCG have relied on various trafficking channels 
and how this relates to the types of firearms they 
favour. This research will add to a modest collection 
of Australian studies that have examined the routes 
by which firearms are transferred from the legal to 
the illegal pool and how this transfer is facilitated.
Methods
The research was undertaken as a collaborative 
project involving the AIC, ACC and AFP, and was 
funded under the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet’s Research Support for National 
Security grants program. The project was approved 
by the AIC Human Research Ethics Committee on 
19 May 2010.
The project consisted of:
•	 a review of open-source literature and compilation 
of case studies and court findings for prosecuted 
cases of firearm trafficking and other, relevant 
firearm offences;
•	 a review of Australian state and territory firearm/
weapons legislation;
•	 analysis of the ACC’s National Firearm Trace 
Database (NFTD); and
•	 compilation of data on the importation of selected 
calibre ammunition (ie 25 ACP, 32 ACP and 380 
ACP) from ammunition distributors and ACBPS.
Literature review
The literature review used information contained  
in open-source documents (mostly peer-reviewed 
papers and government publications) that described 
the characteristics and dynamics of firearm trafficking 
and illicit firearm markets in Australia and other 
selected regions (England and Wales, the United 
States, New Zealand and Western Europe). The 
literature was supplemented with an examination of 
transcripts of court proceedings available on publicly 
accessible legal databases—Australasian Legal 
Information Institute (ie AustLii), NSW LawLink and 
Table 1 Australian firearm legislation
State and territory legislation
Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)
Firearms Act 1996 (Vic)
Weapons Act 1990 (Qld)
Firearms Act 1973 (WA)
Firearms Act 1996 (SA)
Firearms Act 1996 (Tas)
Firearms Act 1996 (ACT)
Firearms Act (NT)
Provisions contained within Commonwealth legislation
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)a
Customs Act 1901 (Cth)b
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 (Cth)c
a: Amended by Crimes Legislation Amendment (People Smuggling, Firearms Trafficking and Other Measures) Act 2002 (Cth)
b: Amended by Customs Legislation Amendment (Criminal Sanctions and Other Measures) Act 2000 (Cth)
c:  Amended by Customs (Prohibited Imports) Amendment Regulations 2000 (No. 7) (Cth) and Customs (Prohibited Imports) Amendment Regulations 2002  
(No. 4) (Cth)
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the Supreme Court of Victoria Court of Appeal 
Registry. Search terms used to identify relevant court 
cases were firearm trafficking, prohibited firearm, 
unregistered firearm, prohibited person, manufacture, 
as well as relevant sections of state and territory 
firearm or weapons legislation. It must be noted that 
most Australian court proceedings are only made 
available for cases heard in higher courts (generally, 
those that have gone to appeal) and hence 
represent a subset of actual relevant cases heard. 
Indeed, a number of ‘high profile’ court cases 
reported in the media were not found in the legal 
databases, the details of which could not be 
confirmed or expanded upon.
Review of Australian firearm/
weapons legislation
The review of Australian firearm and weapons laws 
included an examination of relevant Commonwealth, 
state and territory legislation listed in Table 1. This 
work referenced and updated an earlier review 
undertaken by the AIC (see Davies & Mouzos 2008) 
to:
•	 describe the extent of compliance of Australian 
firearm laws with the resolutions specified in the 
National Firearms Agreement (1996), National 
Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) and 
the National Handgun Control Agreement (2002); 
and
•	 identify where legislative inconsistencies still exist 
that could potentially facilitate firearm diversion.
Analysis of the Australian  
Crime Commission’s National 
Firearm Trace Database
The NFTD, the primary data source for this study, is 
a compilation of unit record data on some unregistered 
firearms recovered by federal, state and territory 
police agencies. The data compiled by the ACC  
were supplemented over the course of the project, 
with records collected by the AFP on some of  
the firearms that had been the subject of police 
investigations in four jurisdictions (New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland and Tasmania) over the period 
1 January 2003–31 December 2010. There were a 
total of 2,750 records on individual firearms in the 
data used for analysis. Almost all of these (ie 99% 
and where information was recorded on the date of 
seizure (n=2,341)) were seized by police between 
June 2002 and October 2011.
Data was de-identified by the ACC before it was 
provided to the AIC. Individual firearms recorded  
in the database were also categorised by the ACC 
before transmission as being recovered in association 
with SOCG or not (referred to herein as non-SOCG). 
A SOCG is an entity engaged in an activity described 
as serious and organised crime as defined in the 
Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 (Cth) (see 
Table 2). Of the 2,750 firearm records used in the 
analysis, 61.9% (n=1,701) were categorised by  
the ACC as firearms seized from SOCG.
Each unit record in the NFTD refers to an individual 
firearm and includes information on:
•	 the make, model, calibre, action and category  
of the firearm;
•	 modifications made to the firearm;
•	 the country in which the firearm was manufactured 
and date of import;
•	 registration history;
•	 whether the firearm was subject to the 1996  
gun buyback (long-arms) or the 2003 handgun 
buyback;
•	 the date and state or territory the firearm was 
recovered;
•	 the reason or activity by which the firearm became 
illicit; and
•	 the illicit context in which the firearm was 
recovered.
Restricted firearms were defined as those long-arms 
that were subject to the 1996 buyback and those 
handguns that were subject to the 2003 buyback. 
The findings from this analysis were described in the 
Milestone 1 progress report.
Some of the variables in the NFTD were 
compromised by missing information. The high 
‘unknown’ return for these variables, which ranged 
between 11 and 98 percent of responses, 
depending on the variable considered, was likely 
related to the absence, until recent years, of a 
systematic method of recording and disseminating 
information on the importation, acquisition and 
disposal of firearms. This affected the validity of 
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Table 2 Definition of serious and organised crime
Serious and organised crime is defined under s 4 of the Australian Crime Commission Act 2002 as:
an offence
(a) that involves 2 or more offenders and substantial planning and organisation; and
(b) that involves, or is of a kind that ordinarily involves, the use of sophisticated methods and techniques; and
(c) that is committed, or is of a kind that is ordinarily committed, in conjunction with other offences of a like kind; and
(d) that is a serious offence within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, an offence against Subdivision B or C of Division 
471, or D or F of Division 474, of the Criminal Code, an offence of a kind prescribed by the regulations or an offence that involves 
any of the following:
(i) theft;
(ii) fraud;
(iii) tax evasion;
(iv) money laundering;
(v) currency violations;
(vi) illegal drug dealings;
(vii) illegal gambling;
(viii) obtaining financial benefits by vice engaged in by others;
(ix) extortion;
(x) violence;
(xi) bribery or corruption of, or by, an officer of the Commonwealth, an officer of a State or an officer of a Territory;
(xii) perverting the course of justice;
(xii) bankruptcy and company violations;
(xiv) harbouring of criminals;
(xv) forging of passports;
(xvi) firearms;
(xvii) armament dealings;
(xviii) illegal importation or exportation of fauna into or out of Australia;
(xix) cybercrime;
(xx) matters of the same general nature as one or more of the matters listed above; and
(da) that is:
(i) punishable by imprisonment for a period of 3 years or more;
(ii) a serious offence within the meaning of the Proceeds of Crimes Act 2002; 
but
(e) does not include an offence committed in the course of a genuine dispute as to matters pertaining to the relations of employees 
and employers by a party to the dispute, unless the offence is committed in connection with, or as part of, a course of activity involving 
the commission of a serious and organised crime other than an offence so committed; and
(f) does not include an offence the time for the commencement of a prosecution for which has expired. 
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some of these variables, a number of which had to 
be removed from the final analysis. The nature of the 
data allowed only for simple statistical treatment.
Importation and distribution  
of ammunition
Twelve ammunition importers and suppliers in 
Australia were contacted regarding the provision  
of data on the quantity of various calibres (25 ACP, 
32 ACP and 380 ACP) of ammunition sold during 
2008–10. These calibres can only be used in small 
pocket pistols (SPPs), which are restricted under 
Australian firearm laws. Of the group of importers/
suppliers contacted, nine responded to the request 
but only four were able to provide any data. The two 
major importers/dealers, responsible for the majority 
of ammunition imported into and sold in Australia, 
declined the request on the grounds that they did 
not have the resources to commit to the collation of 
such a large volume of data.
A data request was also made to ACPBS for 
information on the importation (legal or illegal)  
of these selected ammunition calibres. ACBPS  
was able to provide this information for the period  
1 January 2009 (when ACBPS commenced 
collecting electronic data on import matters) to  
31 December 2011.
Role of the Project 
Committee
The Project Committee was made up of 
representatives from the three research partners—
the AIC, ACC and AFP—as well as representatives 
from the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet, the Attorney-General’s Department and 
ACBPS. The Committee met five times over the 
course of the project (between November 2010  
and April 2012) to discuss project methodology and 
scope, milestone findings and their interpretation, 
and recommendations stemming from the final 
analysis. Draft and final versions of the milestone 
and substantive reports were circulated to the 
Project Committee for their comment.
Observations from Project Committee members and 
other personnel from their respective agencies were 
included as personal communication citations in this 
report where open-source material was not available 
and the subject was of relevance to the discussion. 
The author of these citations is not identified in this 
report.
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Starting in the late 1990s, Australia underwent  
an extensive national firearm law reform process, 
primarily in response to specific incidents such as 
the Port Arthur shootings in Tasmania in 1996 and 
the Monash University shootings in 2002. Following 
these events, the Australian, state and territory 
governments, through the then APMC and COAG, 
entered into three national agreements that became 
responsible for the shaping of contemporary 
Australian firearm laws.
These agreements were the:
•	 National Firearms Agreement (1996);
•	 National Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement 
(2002); and
•	 National Handgun Control Agreement (2002).
The aim of these agreements was to encourage  
the adoption of consistent firearms legislation in all 
states and territories to ensure a uniform national 
approach to the regulation of firearms. While the 
Australian Government has constitutional power to 
legislate in relation to the importation of firearms, the 
responsibility for regulation of the use, possession 
and sale of firearms in each jurisdiction is held by  
the relevant state or territory government. Many of 
the provisions adopted in response to these three 
agreements were relevant to disrupting the diversion 
of firearms to the illicit market and facilitation of illegal 
transactions.
Also shaping Australia’s firearm laws is its commitment 
to international controls. Australia is a signatory to, 
although has yet to ratify, the United Nations Protocol 
against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking  
of Firearms, Their Parts and Components and 
Ammunition 2001 (herein referred to as the UN 
Protocol; UNGA 2001), and is thus committed  
to find measures to handicap the illegal trade in 
firearms and their diversion into the illicit market. The 
preventive provisions specified in the UN Protocol 
recommend signatory states to make legislative 
changes around manufacturing, marking, record 
keeping, deactivation and licensing (or similar type  
of control) on the import and export of firearms. 
These obligations include:
•	 the establishment of a criminal offence for the 
unauthorised manufacture of firearms;
•	 ensuring firearms are marked at time of 
manufacture (and preferably also at time of import, 
time of disposal [other than destruction], time at 
deactivation and time at transfer from government 
stocks to civilian use);
•	 the maintenance of records (for not less than  
10 years) on firearm transactions;
•	 the establishment of criminal offences to prevent 
the illicit reactivation of deactivated firearms; and
•	 the establishment or maintenance of an effective 
system of export and import licensing or 
authorisation for the transfer of firearms, their 
parts and components and ammunition.
Legislative reforms
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National agreements
National Firearms Agreement (1996)
The first of the national agreements—the National 
Firearms Agreement (1996)—emerged in response 
to the mass shootings that occurred at Port Arthur  
in 1996. The Agreement resulted in restricted legal 
possession of automatic and semi-automatic 
firearms and further restricted the legal importation 
of non-military centrefire self-loading firearms to 
those with a maximum magazine capacity of five 
rounds. The Agreement further committed all states 
and territories to a firearms registration scheme and 
licensing of persons in order to legally possess and 
use firearms. Previously, only handguns needed  
to be registered; obligations around long-arm 
registration varied between jurisdictions. In addition 
was the introduction of laws that were designed  
to minimise the legal acquisition of firearms by 
unsuitable persons. The resolutions passed by the 
APMC on 10 May 1996 are summarised in Table 3.
The National Firearms Agreement (1996) was 
implemented by the states and territories in stages  
in the following years, including a provision for a  
Table 3 National Firearms Agreement (1996) resolutions
Bans of specific types of firearm
All jurisdictions to ban the sale, resale, transfer, ownership, possession, manufacture and use of automatic and semi-automatic 
long-arms banned or proposed to be banned from import other than in exceptional circumstances.
All jurisdictions to ban competitive shooting involving the aforementioned firearms.
Nationwide registration of all firearms
States and territories to establish an integrated licence and firearms registration system or review existing registration systems to ensure 
compatibility.
Genuine reason for owning, possessing or using a firearm
Personal protection will not be regarded as a genuine reason for owning, possessing or using a firearm.
‘Genuine reason’ must be demonstrated to own, possess or use a firearm (eg recreational shooters/hunters who produce permission 
from a landowner; bona fide collectors of lawful firearms; sporting shooters with a valid membership of an approved club).
Applicants for a licence for a Category B, C, D and H firearm must also demonstrate a ‘genuine need’ for the particular type of firearm.
Category C firearms will be limited to primary producers.
Basic licence requirements
In addition to the demonstration of ‘genuine reason’, a licence applicant should be aged 18 years or over, be a fit and proper person, be 
able to prove identity (ie 100 point system) and undertake an adequate safety test.
The licence bears a photograph of the licensee and the holder’s address, be endorsed with the category of firearm, be issued after a 
waiting period of not less than 28 days and for a period of no more than five years, be issued subject to undertakings to comply with 
storage requirements and submit to inspection by licensing authorities and be subject to immediate withdrawal of licence and 
confiscation of firearms in certain circumstances.
The following categories be used in the licensing of firearms:
•	 Category A—air rifles; rimfire rifles (excluding self-loading); single and double barrel shotguns
•	 Category B—muzzle-loading firearms; single shot, double barrel and repeating centre fire rifles; break action shotguns/rifle 
combinations
•	 Category C (prohibited except for occupational purposes)a—semi-automatic rimfire rifles with a magazine capacity no greater than 
10 rounds; semi-automatic shotguns with a magazine capacity no greater than five round; pump action shotguns with a magazine 
capacity no greater than five rounds
•	 Category D (prohibited except for official purposes)—self-loading centre fire rifles designed or adapted for military purposes or a 
firearm which substantially duplicates those rifles in design, function or appearance; non-military style self-loading centre fire rifles 
with either an integral or detachable magazine; self-loading shotguns with either an integral or detachable magazine and pump 
action shotguns with a capacity of more than five rounds; self-loading rim-fire rifles with a magazine capacity greater than 10 rounds
•	 Category H—all handguns, including air pistols.
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Table 3 (continued)
Training as a prerequisite for licensing
All jurisdictions require the completion of an accredited course in safety training for firearms for all first time licence applicants (the 
course will be comprehensive and standardised across Australia for all licence categories).
All jurisdictions establish a specialised course for training of persons employed in the security industry.
Grounds for licence refusal or cancellation and seizure of firearms
Among other provisions, jurisdictions set out in legislation circumstances in which licence applications are refused and licences 
cancelled. These would include:
•	 General reasons—not of good character, conviction for an offence involving violence within the past five years, contravene firearm 
law, unsafe storage, no longer genuine reason, not in public interest, not notifying change of address, licence obtained by deceptions.
•	 Specific reasons—applicant/licence holder has been the subject of an Apprehended Violence Order, Domestic Violence Order, 
restraining order or conviction for assault with a weapon/aggravated assault within past five years.
•	 Mental or physical fitness—reliable evidence of a mental or physical condition which would render the applicant unsuitable for 
owning, possessing or using a firearm.
Permit to acquire
Separate permits will be required for the acquisition of every firearm and the issue of a permit should be subject to a waiting period of at 
least 28 days to enable appropriate checks.
Uniform standard for the security and storage of firearms
It should be a precondition to the issuing of a new firearms licence that the licensing authority be satisfied as to the proposed storage 
and security arrangements.
Legislation should include an offence relating to failure to store firearms in the manner required.
Introduce legislative provisions regarding the storage of specific category firearms (Cat A/B and Cat C/D/H).
Introduce legislative provisions regarding the safekeeping of firearms when temporarily away from their usual place of storage.
Recording of sales
Firearm sales to be conducted only by or through licensed firearm dealers.
Firearm dealers should follow specified principles regarding the recording of firearm transactions, including ensure purchaser is 
appropriately licensed, record detailed records of each firearm purchased and sold, provide records to firearms registries, allow police 
personnel investigating a crime or checking dealer compliance to inspect records.
Ammunition should be sold only for those firearms for which the purchaser is licensed. There should also be strict limits put in place on 
the quantity of ammunition that can be purchased in a defined period and the purchaser must produce the relevant licence.
Mail order sales
Mail order arrangement to apply only to licensed gun dealer to licensed gun dealer exchange.
Advertisement for sales will be prohibited unless conducted by or through a licensed gun dealer.
The movement of Category C, D and H firearms must be in accordance with prescribed safety requirements.
The commercial transportation of ammunition will be prohibited.
a:  The APMC later resolved to add a restricted case of shooters—clay target shooters who possess a semi-automatic or pump action shotgun and affiliated with 
the Australian Clay Target Association—to gain access to Category C firearms
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Table 4 National Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) resolutions
1. Increase border protection against illegal firearms.
2. Consider the need for a national ballistics information system.
3. Clarify legislation governing safety testing of imported firearms.
4. Examine legislative or administrative changes required to prevent the release of large quantities of handguns that entered Australia 
prior to recent changes in importation laws.
5. Ensure that provisions in the Australian Postal Corporation Act 1989 (Cth) do not render invalid provisions in state and territory 
legislation regarding the sending of firearms through the mail.
6. Ensure substantial penalties for the illegal possession of a firearm
7. Introduce nationally consistent regulation of the manufacture of firearms
•	 To include provisions encompassing (a) the commercial manufacture of whole firearms (b) small volume whole firearm 
manufacture and (c) the manufacture of firearm parts.
8. Introduce offences relating to defacing serial numbers:
•	 To possess a firearm with a serial number that has been defaced or removed.
•	 To remove or deface a serial number.
9. Introduce an offence of illegal manufacture which attracts substantial penalties.
10. Extend the definition of possession of a firearm.
•	 To include circumstances where an illegal firearm is found in premises with a person or persons but not actually physically 
possessed by any person.
11. Introduce close associate provisions for firearm dealers.
12. Proscribe certain persons from employment in firearm dealerships.
•	 Includes persons (a) who have had a firearms dealer licence revoked in preceding 10 years or had an application for a firearm 
licence or permit refused or revoked, based on the grounds of being not fit and proper and not to be trusted to have possession 
of firearms without danger to public safety or to the peace; or that issue of the licence or permit would be contrary to public 
interest or (b) are subject to an apprehended, domestic or family violence order or (c) are the subject of a good behaviour bond 
relating to an offence of violence or (d) subject to a firearm prohibition order.
13. Provide for increased recording, reporting and inspection of firearm part dealings.
14. Introduce laws designed to restrict the illegal supply of firearms.
•	 To expand the definition of ‘sell’ and ‘purchase’ a firearm.
•	 To establish an offence of selling, or knowingly taking part in the sale of a firearm to another person unless the purchaser is 
authorised to possess the firearm by licence or permit and the seller has inspected the purchaser’s licence or permit and, if the 
purchaser is not a licensed firearms dealer, the purchaser’s permit to acquire the firearm.
•	 To establish an offence of a person other than a licensed dealer selling, or knowingly taking part in the sale of, a firearm to a 
person who is not a licensed dealer unless (a) the sale has been arranged by a licensed dealer or (b) the sale is witnessed by a 
police officer (if a dealer is not available).
•	 A person taking part in the sale of a firearm to include (a) a person who takes, or participates in, any step, or causes any step to 
be taken, in the process of the sale (b) a person who provides or arranges finance for any step in the process or (c) a person 
who provides the premises in which any step in that process is taken. 
15. Make it an offence to conspire to commit an interstate firearm offence.
16. Introduce substantial penalties for firearm record falsification.
•	 To establish an offence of making, with intent to deceive, a false or misleading entry in, or altering, a record regarding a 
transaction or dealings concerning firearms or firearm parts.
•	 To establish an offence of making, with intent to deceive, a false or misleading entry in, or altering, any record required by law 
to be made in relation to a firearm.
17. Establish a Commonwealth cross-border firearms trafficking offence.
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12 month national amnesty and a compensation 
buyback scheme. During this period, the Australian 
Government continued to work with state and 
territory governments to develop new legislative and 
policy initiatives in support of the National Firearms 
Agreement and to improve community safety 
through the regulation of firearms more generally.
National Firearm Trafficking  
Policy Agreement (2002)
In July 2002, the APMC further resolved that 
additional provisions be made to control the illegal 
trade in firearms in Australia. The Trafficking 
Agreement sought to achieve this purpose through:
•	 increased border protection;
•	 the introduction of nationally consistent regulation 
of the legal manufacture of firearms;
•	 the establishment of new offences or substantial 
penalties for matters relating to:
 – the illegal possession and supply of firearms;
 – the defacing of serial numbers;
 – conspiracy to commit interstate firearm 
wrongdoings; and
•	 tighter recording and reporting provisions for 
dealer transactions involving firearm and major 
firearm parts.
The resolutions derived from the National Firearm 
Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) are summarised 
in Table 4.
National Handgun Control 
Agreement (2002)
Following the death of two students in a handgun 
shooting at Monash University in October 2002,  
the Australian, state and territory governments 
implemented further legislative reforms through  
the introduction of the National Handgun Control 
Agreement (2002). The Agreement comprised  
28 resolutions aimed at restricting the availability  
and use of handguns, particularly those that are 
easily concealable. The resolutions included a 
restriction on the possession of handguns based  
on calibre, barrel length and magazine capacity,  
a system of graduated access to handguns for 
legitimate sporting shooters and provisions to 
prevent ‘club shopping’, through the introduction of 
requirements for a person wishing to join a club to 
provide details to the club of any other shooting 
clubs to which they belonged and the firearms they 
owned. Handguns would be limited to a maximum 
of .38” calibre (up to .45” calibre for shooters 
attending specially accredited sporting events),  
with prohibition on semi-automatic handguns with  
a barrel length of less than 120mm and revolvers 
and single shot handguns with a barrel length of less 
than 100mm. In reference to the National Firearms 
Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002), the resolutions 
reiterated the need to establish substantial penalties 
for illegal possession.
The National Handgun Control Agreement (2002) 
was accompanied by a national handgun buyback 
scheme which ran from 1 July to 31 December 
2003. This scheme provided compensation to 
owners surrendering handguns, handgun parts and 
accessories to state and territory authorities during 
the specified six month period. States and territories 
providing compensation were reimbursed by the 
Australian Government under the National Handgun 
Buyback Act 2003 (Cth) which enabled the 
Commonwealth to ‘appropriate funds for the 
purpose of providing financial assistance’.
Specific legislative changes
Australian firearm laws consequently went under 
considerable revision to implement the reforms as 
specified in the aforementioned Agreements. These 
amendments included the introduction of new 
offences and increases to penalties for existing 
offences; many of these amendments were directly 
relevant to deterring the trafficking of firearms or 
were ‘defacto’ responses to this activity (eg 
increasing penalties for illegal possession).
New offence provisions were introduced relating to:
•	 unauthorised possession (or use) of a prohibited 
firearm;
•	 unauthorised possession of firearms in 
‘traffickable’ quantities;
•	 unauthorised sale or purchase of a firearm;
•	 ‘trafficking’ in firearms;
•	 unauthorised manufacture of a firearm or firearm 
parts;
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•	 unauthorised modification of a firearm (eg 
shortening, conversion);
•	 defacement or alteration of identification marks or 
possession of a firearm with defaced identification 
marks;
•	 failure to record dealer transactions on firearm  
and firearm parts;
•	 wilful entry of false records; and
•	 conspiracy to commit a firearm offence outside 
jurisdiction of residence.
In 2008, the AIC undertook a review of Australian, 
state and territory government legislation to examine 
the extent of compliance with the resolutions 
specified in the National Firearms Agreement, the 
National Firearms Policy Trafficking Agreement  
and the National Handgun Control Agreement (see 
Davies & Mouzos 2008). This review found general 
compliance across the states and territories but  
highlighted where differences in laws between  
the jurisdictions still existed. A re-examination of 
inter-jurisdictional compliance and comparability, 
incorporating the further changes made to firearms 
laws in the interim period, is presented in Table 5 
and below.
State and territory amendments
Unauthorised possession of (a) an 
unregistered firearm and (b) a prohibited  
or prescribed firearm
The resolutions from the National Firearms 
Agreement (1996) concerning the nationwide 
registration of firearms and the establishment of 
restricted categories of firearm were accompanied 
by the creation of offences relating to the possession 
of an unregistered firearm and the possession of  
a prohibited or prescribed firearm or pistol. Offence 
provisions regarding unregistered firearms are 
extended in New South Wales, Western Australia, 
Tasmania, the Australian Capital Territory and 
Northern Territory to include the use, sale and 
purchase of such firearms. A separate offence to 
possess, carry or use a prohibited or prescribed 
firearm does not exist in Queensland weapons 
legislation; instead more substantial penalties are 
applied to the possession of standard restricted 
firearm/weapon categories (ie Category D, H and R). 
In Victorian firearms legislation, there is a separate 
offence to possess etc a prohibited handgun 
(Firearms Act 1996 (Vic), s 7A) but not a prohibited 
long-arm. Penalties for the latter offence are, as in 
Queensland, dealt with through the application of 
more substantial penalties for restricted firearm 
categories in the generic possession offence 
(Firearms Act 1996 (Vic), s 6A).
Tasmania has yet to include provisions regarding  
the possession or use of a prohibited or prescribed 
firearm. Section 9 of the Firearms Act 1996 (Tas) 
refers to the offence of possessing or using a firearm 
without the appropriate licence but there is no 
provision for possession or use of a prohibited 
firearm, through either a separate offence or 
application of a greater maximum penalty.
Unauthorised possession of  
firearms in ‘traffickable’ quantities
Four jurisdictions—New South Wales, Victoria, 
Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory—
have created offences or introduced more 
substantial penalties for the unauthorised 
possession of multiple numbers of firearms. In  
New South Wales, the prescribed quantity is three  
or more firearms; in Victoria, Queensland and the 
Australian Capital Territory it is 10 firearms, although 
in legislation from the latter two jurisdictions there is 
an intermediate penalty attached to the possession 
of 10 firearms, of which three are prohibited or 
restricted models. The creation of this offence in  
the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) (through the Firearms 
Amendment (Public Safety) Act 2002 No 47 (NSW)), 
and presumably the rationale for its inclusion in 
firearms laws in the other three jurisdictions, was to 
prevent the ‘warehousing’ or stockpiling of firearms 
and the potential accumulation for the purposes of 
trafficking. There are no stipulations in firearm laws  
in the remaining jurisdictions to deter warehousing  
of firearms.
Unauthorised sale or purchase of firearms
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory 
are the only jurisdictions to have fully complied with 
the legislative requirements relating to the sale and 
purchase of firearms. Most jurisdictions have 
included some form of legislative definition for selling 
(disposing of) and purchasing (acquiring) a firearm, 
although they vary in their conformity with that 
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recommended in the National Firearm Trafficking 
Policy Agreement (2002). Western Australia has yet 
to implement a definition for either.
All jurisdictions have complied with the creation of  
an offence to sell a firearm unless the purchaser is 
authorised; and an offence for a person, other than  
a dealer, to purchase a firearm from a person other 
than a licensed dealer, unless the transaction has 
been arranged by a licensed dealer or other 
approved authority. There is variability, however, 
among the jurisdictions regarding requirements to 
physically inspect a seller’s or purchaser’s licence  
or permit, with these conditions most explicitly 
stated in NSW and ACT firearm laws.
Among the resolutions in the National Firearm 
Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) around new  
laws to restrict the illegal supply of firearms was one 
to expand the definition of involvement in an illegal 
sale to include:
•	 any person who takes, or participates in, any step, 
or causes any step to be taken, in the process of 
sale;
•	 any person who provides or arranges finance for 
any step in the process; or
•	 any person who provides the premises in which 
any step in the process of sale is taken.
New South Wales, South Australia and the 
Australian Capital Territory are the only jurisdictions 
to have implemented the full definition. Victoria has, 
however, established a specific offence for ‘providing 
financial accommodation’ to the illegal acquisition or 
disposal of firearms (Firearms Act 1996 (Vic), s 101B).
Trafficking in firearms
All jurisdictions except South Australia have an 
offence of firearms trafficking or the illegal sale  
of firearms on three or more separate occasions. 
Differences exist between the jurisdictions in the 
quantity of firearms specified, the number of sales 
that need to occur and the time period over which 
sales are to take place for an offence to be 
committed. For example, the offence of unlawful 
trafficking in firearms in Tasmania simply refers to the 
unauthorised sale of unregistered firearms (quantity 
not stipulated) on ‘one or more occasions’ (Firearms 
Act 1996 (Tas), s 110A), whereas in New South Wales 
and the Northern Territory, the illegal sale is to occur 
on three or more separate occasions, although like 
Tasmania there is no provision regarding the quantity 
of firearms trafficked. For a trafficking offence to be 
committed in the Northern Territory, those three sale 
events must occur within a 30 day period, while in 
New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, 
that timeframe has been extended to 12 months.  
It was noted in the second reading speech to the 
Firearms and Crimes Legislation Amendment (Public 
Safety) Act 2003 No 92 (NSW) that the extension  
of the timeframe from three illegal firearm sales in  
30 days to a period of 12 months was to reflect  
the different modus operandi used to traffic firearms 
compared with drugs, on which the 30 day 
turnaround was based. Unlike other jurisdictions, 
New South Wales has also created an additional 
offence of trafficking in firearm parts (Firearms Act 
1996 (NSW), s 51BB).
Western Australian firearm laws define what is 
ostensibly a trafficking offence in prescribing the 
volume of firearms that can be sold—s 19(1)(1aa)  
of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) refers to the sale of 
three or more firearms without a licence or permit 
entitling the sale of any of the firearms tendered. 
Victorian and ACT firearm laws also attach volume 
stipulations to trafficking offences—s 110A of the 
Firearms Act 1996 (Vic) defines a ‘traffickable 
quantity’ of firearms as 10 or more unregistered 
firearms, which for an offence to be committed must 
be acquired or disposed of by a person without  
a dealer’s licence within a seven day period. In  
the Firearms Act 1996 (ACT), the offence specified  
in s 220 comprises either the contravention of a 
dealing provision (per ss 177, 226 or 227—see  
Table 4) on three or more separate occasions over  
a 12 month period (similar to the trafficking offence 
specified in New South Wales) or the contravention 
of a dealing provision involving four or more firearms 
on the same occasion.
Illegal manufacture of firearms
The scale of domestic illegal manufacture of firearm 
and firearm parts is unknown but, as described in 
the following section, is likely to comprise mostly 
small-scale, made-to-order operations. Nonetheless, 
it was recognised as being a potentially important 
contributor to the illicit firearms market and hence 
the offence of illegal manufacture was to be 
established in state and territory firearm laws, with 
substantial maximum penalties attached.
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Table 5 Specific offences introduced or modified into Australian state and territory firearm/weapons legislationa to deter firearm trafficking
Offence NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Unregistered 
firearms
s 36 Offence to sell, 
purchase, possess or 
use unregistered firearm
s 6A Offence to 
possess, carry or 
use unregistered 
longarm
s 7B Offence to 
possess, carry or 
use unregistered 
handgun
s 50A Offence  
to possess an 
unregistered 
weapon
s 19(1) Offence to 
sell, deliver, dispose, 
purchase or possess 
an unlicensed 
firearm
s 23 Offence  
to possess an 
unregistered 
firearm
s 74 Offence to sell, 
acquire, possess or 
use unregistered 
firearm
s 177 Offence to 
dispose, acquire, 
possess or use an 
unregistered firearm
s 59 Offence to sell, 
purchase, possess 
or use an 
unregistered firearm
Unauthorised 
possession of a 
restricted firearm
s 7 Possession or use of 
a prohibited firearm or 
pistol
s 7A Possess etc 
prohibited handgun
s 7B Possess etc 
unregistered 
handgun
s 50 Unlawful 
possession of  
a weapon
s 19(1) Unauthorised 
possession of  
a firearm or 
ammunition
s 19(1)(1ac)(b):
Possession of a 
handgun or 
prescribed firearm
s 11 Unauthorised 
possession or use 
of a firearm
s 9 Unauthorised 
possession or use  
of firearms
s 42 Unauthorised 
possession or use of 
a prohibited firearm
s 58(6) 
Unauthorised 
possession or use of 
a prohibited firearm
Unauthorised 
possession of 
firearms in 
‘traffickable’ 
quantities
s 51D Unauthorised 
possession of firearms 
in aggravated 
circumstances 
ie three or more 
firearms that are not 
registered and owner is 
not authorised to 
possess by licence or 
permit
s 51D(1) non-prohibited 
firearms
s 51D(2) prohibited 
firearm or pistol
s 7C Possession of 
a traffickable 
quantity of 
unregistered 
firearms, that is 
more than 10 
firearms that are not 
registered
s 50(1a) Unlawful 
possession of 10 
or more weapons 
(5 of which are 
Category D, E, H or 
R)
s 50(1b) Unlawful 
possession of 10 
or more weapons
– – – s 42(a) Unauthorised 
possession or use  
of 10 or more 
prohibited firearms
s42(b): Unauthorised 
possession or use  
of three or more 
prohibited firearms 
but less than 10 
prohibited firearms
s 43(a)(i) 
Unauthorised 
possession or use of 
10 or more firearms 
other than prohibited 
firearms
–
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Table 5 (continued)
Offence NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Unauthorised 
sale and 
purchase of 
firearms
s 50 Unauthorised 
purchase of a firearm
s 50AA Unauthorised 
purchase of firearm 
parts
ss 51(1) & 51(1A) Sale 
of firearm/prohibited 
firearm or pistol to 
person not authorised  
to purchase
s 51(2) & 51(2A) Sale  
of firearm/prohibited 
firearm between 
persons that are not 
licensed firearm dealers
s 51A(1) & 51A(2) 
Purchase of firearm 
from unauthorised seller
s 51BA Unauthorised 
sale of firearm parts
s 65 Unauthorised sale 
and purchase of 
ammunition
s 93 Persons from 
whom a dealer can 
acquire firearms
s 94 Persons to who 
a dealer can dispose 
firearms
s 95 Prohibition on 
acquisition of a 
firearm except from 
licensed firearms 
dealer
s 96 Prohibition on 
disposal of firearm 
except to licensed 
firearms dealer
s 101B Prohibition 
on providing 
financial 
accommodation
s 125 Disposal  
of cartridge 
ammunition to 
unauthorised 
persons
s 35(1) 
Unauthorised 
acquisition of  
a weapon
s 36(1) 
Unauthorised 
disposal of  
a weapon
s 50B Unlawful 
supply of weapons
s 19(1) 
Unauthorised sale, 
disposal, delivery  
or purchase of  
a firearm or 
ammunition
s 19(2) Sale, 
disposal or delivery 
of a firearm or 
ammunition to 
unauthorised 
purchaser
s 14 Unauthorised 
acquisition of a 
firearm
s 14a 
Unauthorised 
supply of a 
firearm
s 16 Dealing in 
firearms and 
ammunition 
without a dealer’s 
licence 
s 21B 
Unauthorised 
acquisition of 
ammunition
s 10 Unauthorised 
acquisition of  
a firearm
s 11 Unauthorised 
dealing in firearms 
(eg sell, possess for 
purpose of sale)
s 24 Purchase by 
unlicensed dealer
s 25 Licensed 
dealer purchase  
or sale from 
unauthorised person
s 105(1)(2) 
Unauthorised sale 
and acquisition of 
ammunition
s 177 Unlawful 
disposal or 
acquisition of an 
unregistered firearm
s 226 Unlawful 
disposal of a firearm
s 227 Unlawful 
acquisition of a 
firearm
s 248 Unlawful 
acquisition of 
ammunition
s 62 Unauthorised 
purchase of  
a firearm
s 63 Unauthorised 
sale of a firearm
s 68A Unauthorised 
sale and acquisition 
of ammunition
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Table 5 (continued)
Offence NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Trafficking in 
firearms
s 51B Contravene s 51 
(unauthorised sale of 
firearms) on three or 
more occasion over  
12 month period
s 51BB Contravene  
s 51BA (unauthorised 
sale of firearm parts) on 
three or more occasions 
over 12 month period
s 101A Prohibition 
on the acquisition  
or disposal of 
traffickable 
quantities of 
firearms
s 65 Unlawful 
trafficking in 
weapons
s 19(1)(1aa) 
Unauthorised selling, 
delivering or 
disposing of three  
or more firearms
– s 110A Unlawful 
trafficking in 
firearms
s 220 Trafficking  
in firearms
s 63A Contravene  
s 63 on three or 
more separate 
occasions during 
course of 30 day 
consecutive period
Unauthorised 
manufacture
s 50A(1) Unauthorised 
manufacture of  
a firearm
s 50A(2) Unauthorised 
manufacture of a 
prohibited firearm  
or pistol
s 59 Carry on the 
business of being  
a firearms dealer 
without licence  
or permit (note: 
includes 
manufacturing  
a firearm or 
possessing any  
parts to manufacture 
a firearm)
s 69(1A) 
Manufacture of a 
weapon by person 
other than licensed 
armourer
s 19(4) Manufacture 
a firearm without 
authorising licence
s 27 Unauthorised 
manufacture or 
taking part in 
manufacture of 
firearm or firearm 
part
s 11 Unauthorise d 
dealing in firearms 
(note: dealing 
includes 
manufacture 
firearms and 
firearms parts)
s 228 Unauthorised 
manufacture of a 
firearm
s 61(1) Manufacture 
a firearm without a 
licence or permit
s 61(2) Manufacture 
a prohibited firearm 
or pistol without a 
licence or permit
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Table 5 (continued)
Offence NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Unauthorised 
modification 
s 62 Unauthorised 
shortening of a firearm
s 63 Unauthorised 
conversion of a firearm 
(1) shorten to a pistol 
(1A) alter construction or 
action to convert to 
prohibited pistol (2) alter 
construction or action to 
convert to non-
prohibited firearm (3) 
alter construction or 
action to convert to 
prohibited firearm
s 134 Alteration of a 
firearm (1) shorten 
barrel (2) reverse 
inoperability
s 134A 
Unauthorised 
conversion
s 61 Shorten  
a firearm
s 62 Modify 
construction  
or action
s2 3(5)(c) 
Unauthorised 
alteration—from 
design or 
characteristics, 
calibre etc
s 29A(2)(a) 
Possession of 
mechanism to 
convert firearm  
to automatic
s 116 Shorten a 
firearm <65cm
s 117 Unauthorised 
alteration of 
construction or 
action of firearm
s 240 Unauthorised 
shortening of a 
firearm
s 241 Unauthorised 
conversion of a 
firearm (1) shorten 
into a pistol (2) alter 
construction or 
action to convert 
prohibited firearm  
to non-prohibited 
firearm
s 61A Unauthorised 
modification (or 
repair) of a firearm
s 68 Unauthorised 
alteration of safe 
operation or 
conversion to 
another category
Alteration of 
identifying marks 
s 66 (a) Deface or alter 
identification mark on 
firearm or barrel (b) 
Possess firearm or 
barrel with deface or 
altered ID
s 134(3) Deface or 
alter any number, 
letter or other 
identifying symbol  
or mark on firearm
s134C Unauthorised 
possession of a 
firearm without a 
serial number
s 63 (a) Deface or 
alter identifying 
serial number of 
mark (b) possess 
such a weapon  
(c) acquire or sell 
such a weapon
s 23 (5)(a) Defaces 
or removes any 
number or 
identification mark 
(b) possesses such 
a firearm
s 24A(7)(a) 
Defaces, alters  
or removes 
identifying 
characters  
(b) possesses 
such a firearm
s 124 Intentionally 
or recklessly deface 
or alters any 
number, letter or 
identification mark 
on any firearm or 
firearm part
s 252 (1) Defaces, 
alters or removes  
a number, letter or 
other identification 
mark on a firearm or 
firearm barrel (2) 
possesses such a 
firearm and knows a 
number, letter or 
other identification 
mark has been 
defaced etc
s 74 (1) Alter an 
identifying mark (2) 
Knowingly possess 
such a firearm (3) 
Deface or remove 
an identifying mark 
(4) Knowingly 
possess such a 
firearm
Conspiracy to 
commit offence 
outside 
jurisdiction of 
residence
s 51C Conspire to 
commit or aid 
commission of offence 
outside New South 
Wales
s 124AA Conspiring 
to commit and 
aiding the 
commission of an 
offence outside 
Victoria
– – – s 120A Conspiracy 
to commit firearms 
offence in another 
jurisdiction
– s 60A Conspiring to 
commit and aiding 
commission of 
offence outside 
Territory
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Table 5 (continued)
Offence NSW Vic Qld WA SA Tas ACT NT
Close associate 
provisions for 
firearm dealers
s 44(4) Provision of false 
or misleading 
information about close 
associates
s 75A Requirement 
to notify 
Commissioner of 
close associates
s 10C Licensed 
dealers associate 
to be fit and proper 
person
s 25A Provision of 
information on 
dealer’s associate 
if requested
s 6D Information 
about close 
associates of 
applicant for issue 
or renewal of 
dealer’s licence
s 6G Provision of 
information on close 
associates
s 17(3)(a)(1a) 
Register to refuse 
application for 
dealers licence if 
close associate is 
not a fit and 
proper person
s 20 Cancellation 
etc of licence if 
close associate is 
not a fit and 
proper person
s 99A(1b) 
Cancellation of 
licence—close 
associate is not fit 
and proper person 
s 93A Failure to 
provide 
Commissioner with 
business 
management 
declaration 
(including 
information on close 
associates)
s 186 Information 
about close 
associates of certain 
firearm dealersb
s 16A Failure to 
keep or provide 
false and misleading 
information about 
close associates
Proscribe certain 
persons from 
employment in 
firearm 
dealership
s 44A Proscribed 
persons not to be 
involved in firearms 
dealing business
s 75B Offence to 
employ prohibited 
persons in 
management of 
business
s 70 Employees of 
dealers and 
armourers to be 
qualified weapons 
employee
s 6F Persons not to 
be involved in 
firearm dealership
– s 96A Employment 
restrictions—
proscribed persons
s 190 Prohibited 
persons not to be 
involved in firearms 
dealing business
s 20 Restriction on 
employing 
prescribed persons
Increased 
recording
s 45(1) Ensure recording 
of transactions and 
dealings concerning 
firearms and firearm 
parts
s 87 Requirement to 
keep register of 
transactions
s 71 Licensed 
dealers and 
armourers to keep 
register
ss 17–18 Maintain 
records of 
ammunition sales 
and firearm dealings
s 18 Failure to 
keep records on 
dealings in 
firearms and 
ammunition
s 89 Keep records 
of all dealings with 
firearms, firearm 
parts and 
ammunition
s 193 Failure to 
keep records on 
each acquisition and 
disposal of firearm 
and firearm parts
s 18 Records to be 
kept by dealers
a: Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), Firearms Act 1996 (Vic); Weapons Act 1990 (Qld); Firearms Act 1973 (WA); Firearms Act 1996 (SA); Firearms Act 1996 (Tas); Firearms Act 1996 (ACT); Firearms Act (NT)
b: Criminal Code offences for giving false or misleading information
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Six of the eight jurisdictions have introduced an 
offence of unauthorised manufacture; the offence  
in South Australia also includes the manufacture  
of firearm parts as well as complete firearms. The 
exceptions are Victoria and Tasmania, which include 
manufacturing under the definition of ‘carrying on 
the business of being a firearms dealer’ (Firearms 
Act 1996 (Vic) s 59(3)(d)) or ‘deal, in relation to a 
firearm’ (Firearms Act 1996 (Tas) s 3) respectively. 
Depending on jurisdiction, maximum penalties vary 
according to the class or restricted status of the 
firearm being manufactured.
Unauthorised modification/alteration  
of identifying marks
The implementation of restricted categories of 
firearm was later accompanied with the inclusion  
of offences relating to the modification of firearms, 
specifically the shortening of firearms and alterations 
to the construction or action of a firearm to convert  
it from a non-prohibited to prohibited model or vice 
versa. Most jurisdictions have complied with these 
provisions, although Western Australia has not 
included an offence related to the shortening of  
a firearm, and in Tasmanian legislation the sole 
modification offence relates only to the possession 
of a mechanism to convert a firearm to automatic 
firing.
An additional measure recommended in the National 
Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) was  
to create an offence of altering or defacing a 
firearm’s identifying marks. Illicit firearms often  
have obliterated serial numbers or similar identifying 
markers. There has been cross-jurisdictional 
compliance in the creation of an offence of altering 
or defacing a firearm’s identifying mark, or in Victoria 
of possessing a firearm without a serial number, but 
Tasmania has not implemented a complementary 
offence of possessing a firearm with defaced 
markings. The offence in New South Wales and 
Australian Capital Territory extends to defacing an 
identifying mark on a firearm barrel, not just the 
complete firearm, as well as possessing a firearm 
barrel with an obliterated identifying mark. 
Possession offences in the Australian Capital 
Territory and the Northern Territory stipulate the 
owner knowingly possessing a firearm with a 
defaced or obliterated identifying mark, whereas  
in New South Wales, Queensland, Western Australia 
and South Australia this intention is not explicitly 
stated (and presumably must be established for an 
offence to occur).
Commission of an  
interstate firearm offence
Four jurisdictions (New South Wales, Victoria, 
Tasmania and the Australian Capital Territory) have 
complied with the resolution to establish an offence 
to conspire to commit an interstate firearms offence. 
In these jurisdictions, the offender is subject to the 
same penalty that the offender would be subject  
to had the offence been committed within the 
jurisdiction of residence.
The remaining four jurisdictions have no such 
provisions. While some jurisdictions do have 
offences relating to conspiracy to commit an offence 
and aiding or abetting in the commission of an 
offence, such as the ACT’s Criminal Code 2002, 
these extensions of criminal responsibility relate only 
to offences against the jurisdiction’s laws and not to 
an interstate offence as intended by the resolution.
Record keeping
It was resolved in the National Firearms Agreement 
(1996) that dealers should be required to record and 
maintain details of each firearm purchased or sold 
(against the prescribed particulars of the client) and 
to provide records to the state/territory licensing 
authority on a consistent (usually quarterly) basis. 
These records must also be made available for 
inspection to police when requested.
All jurisdictions have complied with the requirement 
for dealers to record and maintain the details of all 
transactions and dealings, to send these records  
to the licensing authority for inclusion in the register 
and to allow police to inspect dealers’ records. 
These provisions comprise dealings relating to  
both firearms and firearm parts—these are either 
expressly included under the recording requirements 
or comprise major component parts under the 
definition of a firearm.
The provision of false or misleading information has 
been established as an offence in firearm legislation 
or, as in the case of Western Australia, in reference 
to the general offence of giving false or misleading 
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information as stipulated in the Criminal Code.  
Only New South Wales, Queensland and Western 
Australia have additionally established a specific 
offence for a firearms dealer making a false or 
misleading entry or altering a record in the dealer’s 
register.
Close associations and employment  
of proscribed persons
To prevent the potential exploitation of firearm 
dealerships, state and territory firearm laws have 
been amended so that applications for (or renewal 
of) dealer licences can be refused where a close 
associate of the applicant is deemed not to be a fit 
and proper person. Close associate provisions also 
prevent ineligible persons from using eligible persons 
to ‘front’ a firearms dealership. A ‘close associate’  
is defined as someone who holds or will hold any 
relevant financial interest (or other relevant power)  
in the business or holds or will hold any relevant 
position. In all jurisdictions, the disclosure of this 
information is incorporated in stipulations on 
acquiring a firearm dealers’ licence and forms the 
basis of offences of failure to provide, or provision  
of false or misleading, information.
South Australia is the one jurisdiction that has not 
introduced provisions prohibiting the employment  
of proscribed persons in dealerships. A proscribed 
person is one that:
•	 has, within the preceding 10 years, had a firearm 
dealer licence revoked; or
•	 has, within the preceding 10 years, had an 
application for a firearms licence or permit refused 
or revoked, on the grounds of not being fit and 
proper and not to be trusted of having possession 
of a firearm without danger to public safety or 
peace; or that issue of the licence or permit would 
be contrary to the public interest; or
•	 is subject to an apprehended, domestic or family 
violence order (or similar); or
•	 is the subject of a good behaviour bond relating  
to an offence of violence; or 
•	 is subject to a firearms prohibition order.
Queensland has legislated to restrict dealers from 
employing a person who will have access to 
weapons unless the person is a ‘qualified weapons 
employee’, meaning a person who is 18 years or 
over and holds a firearms licence. This scheme 
substantially complies with the requirements not to 
employ proscribed persons, as ‘proscribed persons’ 
as defined would also be disqualified from obtaining 
a licence. The one difference is the period of 
restriction, which in Queensland only refers to  
the past five years and not 10 years as specified 
elsewhere.
Commonwealth amendments
Together with the changes to state and territory 
firearm and weapons laws, which absorbed the  
bulk of these reforms, were amendments to 
Commonwealth law, specifically the import and 
export of firearms and the cross-border trafficking  
of firearms.
In 2000, the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) was amended 
by the Customs Legislation Amendment (Criminal 
Sanctions and Other Measures) Act 2000 (Cth)  
to introduce special criminal offences relating to  
the import and export of Tier 1 and Tier 2 goods  
(ss 233BAA and 233BAB respectively). Offences 
relating to the importation and exportation of 
restricted firearms (as specified under s 4F of the 
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations 1956 
(Cth), Tier 2 goods) were now made punishable on 
conviction by a penalty of up to $250,000 fine and/
or 10 years imprisonment.
Restrictions on the importation of handguns and 
handgun parts were introduced first with the 
Customs (Prohibited Imports) Amendment 
Regulations 2000 (No. 7) (Cth) so that handguns 
were ‘released into the community on an ‘as needs’ 
basis [only] and once a legitimate end user ha[d] 
been established’ (Explanatory Statement: np). The 
Regulations also ensured that only a limited number 
of handguns, as well as Category C firearms, could 
be imported as dealer stock for the purposes of 
testing and demonstration. The Customs (Prohibited 
Imports) Amendment Regulations 2002 (No. 4) (Cth) 
imposed further controls on the importation of 
handguns and handgun parts, specifically prohibiting 
the importation of handguns (and handgun parts)  
for models with a calibre greater than .38”, a barrel 
length of less than 120mm for semi-automatic 
handguns and less than 100mm for revolvers and 
single-shot handguns, and/or a magazine/shot 
capacity exceeding 10 rounds.
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The firearms provisions of the Crimes Legislation 
Amendment (People Smuggling, Firearms Trafficking 
and Other Measures) Act 2002 (Cth) amended  
the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and commenced 
on 16 January 2003. The changes to the Act 
established a criminal offence, in the course of trade 
or commerce between any states and territories, to 
illegally dispose of or acquire a firearm, or to take or 
send a firearm from one state or territory to another, 
intending that the firearm will be disposed of illegally 
(see Division 360 Part 9.4 Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth). The maximum penalty on conviction for either 
offence is 10 years imprisonment, a fine equivalent 
to 2,500 penalty units or both.
Specific loopholes
Part of the National Firearms Agreement (1996) 
resolved that jurisdictions were to establish an 
integrated system for the registration of firearms. All 
states and territories complied; however, variations 
in the legislative definition of a firearm resulted in 
inconsistencies arising between jurisdictions in the 
requisite registration of deactivated firearms and of 
specified firearm parts.
Deactivation
A deactivated (or inoperable) firearm is one that has 
been rendered incapable of discharging shot, bullets 
or other projectiles by means of an explosive charge 
or compressed gas and cannot be returned to  
its original firing condition (without modifying the 
appearance of the firearm; see Customs (Prohibited 
Imports) Regulations 1956—Reg 4F). The legislation 
in New South Wales and the Australian Capital 
Territory describes a firearm as a gun or other 
weapon that is (or at any time was) capable of 
propelling a projectile by means of an explosive; 
deactivated or inoperable firearms are thus included 
in the definition of a firearm. Similarly, in Victoria, 
Tasmania and the Northern Territory, the definition  
of a firearm is broad enough to include deactivated 
or inoperable firearms. In these jurisdictions, firearms 
remain ‘accountable’ even when deactivated. This 
means that a firearm’s registration status is not 
invalidated if it is deactivated and record of the 
firearm is retained with the relevant firearm register.
Deactivated firearms, however, do not fall within the 
legislative definition of a firearm in South Australia 
and Western Australia. Deactivated Category H 
firearms in Queensland are still considered a firearm 
but not deactivated long-arms. A firearm in these 
two former states, and a long-arm in Queensland, 
loses its accountability status on being certified  
as deactivated. This poses a problem where 
deactivation standards are not uniform or verified  
by the licensing authority. One way ‘deactivated’ 
firearms that have been deemed unaccountable  
may enter the illicit pool is through the transfer of  
the serial number from the deactivated firearm to 
another, operable firearm, with the purpose of 
concealing the identity of the latter firearm. The other 
is through the reactivation of (deliberately) poorly 
deactivated firearms. A deactivation loophole in 
Queensland legislation inadvertently led to the 
deactivation of reportedly thousands of handguns  
by Queensland-based dealers and based on firearm 
seizure data, the transfer of some of these handguns 
into the national illicit pool (Project stakeholder 
personal communication 24 September 2010). Prior 
to amendments to the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld)  
and Weapons Regulation 1996 (Qld), a handgun if 
rendered inoperable lost any requirement to remain 
registered in Queensland. Compounding this 
vulnerability was the lack of inspection of the firearm 
once the deactivation process had taken place and 
many thousands of poorly deactivated handguns 
were reactivated by firearm enthusiasts and 
criminals, and made their way into the illicit market 
(Project stakeholder personal communication 24 
September 2010). Of note is the inclusion now in 
Queensland legislation of an offence to reverse the 
inoperability of a firearm that has been proscribed 
under the Act to be rendered inoperable (Weapons 
Act 1990 (Qld)), s 62(2)).
State and territory firearm laws now stipulate 
deactivation standards that generally align with each 
other and those prescribed in the Australian Federal 
Police Firearm Deactivation Standards, which were 
endorsed by the then APMC in 2006. Depending on 
jurisdiction, these standards apply to specific firearm 
types, categories and/or models. In Queensland, the 
Weapons Amendment Act 2011 (Qld) amended the 
Weapons Regulation 1996 (Qld) to include firearm 
deactivation standards consistent with the 
aforementioned AFP Firearm Deactivation Standards 
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(Schedule 2A), while in South Australia, a SAPOL 
deactivation policy stipulates deactivation 
procedures to be adhered to. The latter policy 
requires deactivated firearms, irrespective of whether 
an owner or dealer has undertaken the deactivation, 
to be inspected by the SAPOL Armoury Section.  
A ‘Certificate of Deactivation’ is issued only where 
the deactivation has been completed according to 
standard.
Registration of firearm parts
Prior to the implementation of the Firearms 
Amendment (Trafficking) Act 2001 No 24 (NSW),  
a technical error in the definition of a handgun in 
New South Wales legislation enabled the diversion  
of many handguns to the illicit market (Project 
stakeholder personal communication 24 September 
2010). The Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) as originally 
enacted, required firearm barrels, but not frames or 
receivers, to be registered under Part 3 (Registration 
of Firearms) of the Act. The exemption of frames and 
receivers meant handguns without barrels could be 
sold without having to observe regulations on firearm 
disposal and frames/receivers could be purchased 
without need to register them. This opened up 
opportunities to convert or build up new handguns 
using non-registrable parts purchased in New South 
Wales with parts purchased elsewhere (Project 
stakeholder personal communication 24 September 
2010). Among the amendments prescribed in the 
Firearms Amendment (Trafficking) Act 2001 No 24 
(NSW) was the stipulation that registration now 
‘applies to every firearm frame and firearm receiver  
in the same way as it applies to a firearm’ (s 93(1)).
Legislation regarding the registration of firearm parts 
is not clear but it appears that jurisdictions excluding 
Western Australia, Tasmania and the Australian 
Capital Territory have made (at least some) firearm 
parts subject to registration. Jurisdictional variation 
exists as to whether specified firearm parts are 
contained within the definition of a firearm; for 
example, Queensland includes ‘a major component 
of a firearm’ in its definition of a firearm (Weapons 
Act 1990 (Qld), sch 2) and South Australia includes 
‘a receiver of a firearm and any device, which if in 
working order, would be a firearm’ (Firearms Act 
1977 (SA), s 5). The Northern Territory also includes 
firearm parts in its definition of a firearm. In New 
South Wales and Victoria, specified parts require 
registration.
The registration of firearm parts was not considered 
by the National Firearm Agreements (1996) and 
regulation of all firearm parts is not necessarily a 
feasible option. However, ensuring the mandatory 
registration of major component firearm parts (eg 
frames and receivers) in all jurisdictions would enable 
police to more easily trace ownership history and  
the movement of firearms constructed illegally from 
firearm parts.
Conclusion
Prior to the firearm law reforms described above, it 
could be argued that opportunities to divert firearms 
were inadvertently facilitated by legislative loopholes 
or oversights and/or a general lack of deterrence 
based on the offences proscribed and the maximum 
penalties attached. The extensive nature of the 
reforms and the subsequent amendments to close 
identified gaps and further increase penalties 
suggest a considerable amount has already been 
accomplished in legislatively deterring the flow of 
firearms from the licit to the illicit market. This is not 
to suggest that inconsistencies in firearm laws, 
particularly between jurisdictions, cannot or will not 
be tested. For example, it has been suggested by 
stakeholders consulted for this project that dealers 
who are involved in the illegal diversion of firearms 
will continue to test the legislation to identify avenues 
for exploitation (Project stakeholders personal 
communication 4 May 2011; 28 November 2011). 
These avenues may not be detected by law 
enforcement agencies until after the fact, such  
as occurred with the Queensland ‘deactivation’  
and New South Wales ‘firearm receiver’ loopholes 
described previously.
Areas where legislative accord could be improved 
concern the activities of dealerships and registration 
and manufacture of firearm parts. Resolutions 
specified in the National Firearm Trafficking Policy 
Agreement (2002) aimed to deter dealer involvement 
in the illicit market by prohibiting certain persons 
being employed in dealerships, requiring the 
provision of close associate information, enabling 
better scrutiny of firearm dealings (through 
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mandatory recording and provision of transaction 
records) and making it an offence to wilfully record  
a false or misleading entry in records on firearm and 
firearm part transactions. Strengthening provisions 
around false entries, such as recording false disposal 
or sales notices, false interstate transfer or failure to 
record receipt of goods, may deter (some) dealers 
from making wilful false entries to conceal the 
diversion of firearms. The maximum penalty for this 
offence, usually a relatively minimal fine, may not 
produce the adequate deterrence to offset the 
temptation to falsify records.
State and territory firearms laws are not completely 
consistent in the legal definition of a firearm or what 
constitutes a major firearm component or part (and 
hence requires registration). It was noted above that 
registration of all firearm parts has not been judged  
a feasible option (eg the registration of components 
would require considerable resources and technical 
expertise to implement properly) but uniform 
regulation of major parts (including spare receivers 
and frames) would prevent diversion opportunities as 
witnessed in New South Wales with non-registrable 
receivers. The vulnerability of firearm parts to the 
illicit trade additionally recommends the uniform 
adoption of an offence to illegally manufacture parts, 
not just complete firearms, which is presently only  
an offence in South Australia.
Inter-jurisdictional inconsistencies in legislation, 
however, tend to be localised in that one or two 
jurisdictions have failed to introduce specific offences 
that have been implemented elsewhere (eg the 
absence of an offence of trafficking in firearms in 
South Australia or the possession of a prohibited  
or prescribed firearm in Tasmania). The significance 
of these inconsistencies is debatable, although  
as noted in Davies and Mouzos (2008: 55), the 
‘departures from the resolutions of the firearm 
agreements…are potentially detrimental to the 
integrity of the scheme’ and standardisation would 
‘give full effect to the national principles of firearm 
controls as envisaged’.
Nonetheless, the review undertaken by Davies and 
Mouzos (2008) and revisited for this study, suggests 
that most of the past legislative looseness has been 
tightened and outside of increasing penalties, which 
might produce further deterrence, other avenues of 
scrutiny and control are better served by revision or 
improvement.
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•	 The ‘grey market’ comprises unregistered 
firearms. Prior to the National Firearms Agreement 
(1996), only handguns had to be registered in  
all Australian jurisdictions; mandatory long-arm 
registration varied between the states and 
territories. Grey market firearms are those firearms 
that should have been registered or surrendered 
(for restricted models) in the gun buybacks  
that have occurred since the National Firearms 
Agreement (1996), but for a multitude of reasons 
were not. In some cases, this was probably 
because the owner chose not to comply with the 
new legislative requirements but in others because 
the firearms had been misplaced, lost or forgotten 
about. Grey market firearms are not held, used  
or conveyed for criminal purposes but have been 
identified as often ending up in the illicit market.
•	 The illicit market comprises any firearm that has 
been illegally imported into Australia, illegally 
manufactured in Australia or diverted from the  
licit or grey markets. Illicit firearms may be used  
in criminal activities.
The introduction of mandatory registration 
requirements with the firearm reforms now provides 
a count of the legal market—there were over  
2.7 million firearms registered in Australia as of 
December 2011. It is not possible, however, to 
estimate the size of either the grey or illicit markets. 
The grey market may be substantial but there are no 
reliable estimates of the volume of it or the illicit 
market.
In their study of illegal firearm markets in the United 
States, Pierce et al. (2004: 392) emphasised that  
the ‘complexity’ of these markets and the paucity of 
information about how illicit firearm markets operate 
‘presents substantial challenges to policy makers 
and law enforcement agencies in disrupting supply’. 
Information on firearm trafficking and the intricate 
workings of the illicit market in Australia is similarly 
limited. There is general agreement on the likely 
sources of illicit firearms, and the conduits through 
which they are trafficked, but less consensus on  
the importance of these in supplementing the illicit 
market. Some of this difference in opinion relates to 
the viewpoint of different interest groups, in particular 
whether market replenishment is mostly derived 
from ‘internal’ sources (such as the theft of legal 
firearms) or reliant on a consistent flow of items from 
outside Australia (through illegal importation). Yet 
much of this uncertainty ultimately derives from the 
difficulty in estimating contribution in the absence of 
complete data.
Type and size of markets
Three primary firearm markets exist in Australia—the 
licit, grey and illicit markets. These are as follows:
•	 The licit market comprises all firearms that have 
been registered with the relevant authority and 
held by an owner with the appropriate licence(s)  
to possess and use the specified firearm(s).
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Sources and conduits
Illegal importation, theft, illicit manufacture (albeit 
small), the activities of some corrupt dealers, and 
legacy legislative and procedural loopholes all 
represent recognised methods by which firearms, 
firearm parts and ammunition have been or currently 
are trafficked into or within Australia (ACC 2011, 
2009, 2008; Kerlatec 2007; Mouzos 1999; Qld CMC 
2004). The trafficking of illicit firearms might be 
described as being dependent on two sources of 
supply—point sources and diffuse sources (Braga  
et al. 2002). Point sources represent the more 
organised spectrum of illegal firearm transfer, best 
typified by ongoing diversion of firearms from some 
corrupt firearm dealers or illegal importation. Diffuse 
sources are less routine or less dependable 
‘acquisitions’, for example, from theft or informal, 
clandestine sales. These recognised methods of 
trafficking are described here.
Illegal importation
Many, if not the majority of, firearms in both the grey 
and illicit markets were most likely legally imported 
into Australia prior to the firearm and related reforms 
(see next section). In 2010–11, a total of 85,035 
firearms were legally imported into Australia and 
4,540 were exported (ACBPS 2011a). In the same 
period, ACBPS recorded the detection of 5,922 
undeclared firearms/airguns, parts and accessories, 
although not all of these undeclared items were 
brought in through deliberate, illegal import activity 
and most of these items were described as ‘low  
risk’ (Project stakeholder personal communication  
7 December 2011).
Aside from the concern that restricted firearm 
models are being illegally brought into the country  
is the risk surrounding the illegal importation of parts 
and accessories which can then be used to 
manufacture restricted firearms or modify existing 
Table 6 Reported illegal importation of firearms, parts and ammunition 2004–11
Item Method of import
Parts for Uzi sub-machine gun Post
‘Handgun’ parts Post
MG42 machine gun parts Post
Airsoft handgun and ammunition (with other prohibited weapons) Luggage
Rifle barrel for M1 carbine Post
Replica handguns/replica flintlock rifles Not specified
Frame and 3 15-round 9mm magazines for semi-automatic pistol Post
76 replica flintlock pistols/22 replica flintlock rifles Sea cargo
9mm semi-automatic pistol Post
Six handguns (4 x .32 semi-automatic pistols, 1 x .25 semi-automatic pistol and 1 x .22 revolver) Sea cargo
Handmade shotgun Air cargo
9mm semi-automatic pistol Sea cargo
AK-47 assault rifle (dismantled) Post
Airsoft firearm parts Luggage
15 military style firearm magazines and stock for ‘Steyr’ rifle Post
Air rifle (disassembled)/air rifle ammunition Post
Four magazines for semi-automatic pistol and firing pin Post
2,000 airsoft BB guns Sea cargo
‘Parts’ for a semi-automatic pistol Post
1,500 BB guns Sea cargo
Source: ACBPS 2011b, 2009, 2008a–f, 2007a–c, 2006a–d, 2005a–c, 2004a–b
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firearms. Media reports from the ACBPS (see Table 
6) and AIC discussions with stakeholders indicate 
that it is the illegal importation of parts which is the 
more common scenario. The servicing of the current 
illicit market through illegal imports is not an 
unproven channel but may not be as important a 
trafficking route as some commentators expect or 
assert (eg see ABC 2011) and despite more recent 
high-profile cases (eg see AAP & Davies 2012). This 
may be because the process of illegal importation  
is possibly perceived as a less reliable option for 
firearm acquisition due to increased surveillance 
from the ACBPS, in combination with police 
agencies, and thus a greater chance of detection 
(Project stakeholders personal communication  
28 November 2011; 7 December 2011).
Theft
Theft is cited as an important source of illegal 
firearms in countries such as the United States 
(Kleck & Wang 2009; Pierce et al. 2004; Wright & 
Rossi 1994) and inferred in other jurisdictions such 
as England and Wales (Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 
2006) and within the European Union (Spapens 
2007). Data collected for the AIC’s National Firearm 
Theft Monitoring Program showed that over the  
five years between 1 July 2004 and 30 June 2009, 
an average 1,545 firearms were reported stolen  
to Australian state and territory police (Borzycki  
& Mouzos 2007; Bricknell 2011, 2009, 2008a; 
Bricknell & Mouzos 2007), less than half the average 
number of firearms reported stolen during the 
previous decade (Mouzos 2002). Around three-
quarters of thefts were from private residential 
premises, with a mix of targeted and opportunistic 
incidents recorded. Less restricted firearms (eg 
Category A and B firearms—see Table 8) comprised 
the majority of firearms stolen in this period, most 
likely a reflection of the prevalence of these firearms 
among the Australian firearm-owning community 
rather than a necessary preference for such models. 
Handgun theft has remained consistently below  
10 percent and restricted Category C and D firearms 
(such as pump action shotguns and semi-automatic 
rifles) rarely featured in firearm theft reports (less than 
1% of all reported stolen firearms). Firearms from just 
12–14 percent of reported theft incidents between 
2004–05 and 2008–09 were recovered by police in 
the 12 months following the report of the theft 
(Borzycki & Mouzos 2007; Bricknell 2011, 2009, 
2008a; Bricknell & Mouzos 2007), indicating a 
sizeable, annual contribution of stolen firearms to  
the illicit market.
Illicit manufacture
Illicit manufacture refers to the unauthorised 
production of a firearm from raw materials or 
assembly using disassembled and/or new firearm 
parts. It has been predicted that the illicit firearm 
market will (increasingly) be supplied by a ‘growing 
domestic market of locally manufactured firearms’ 
(Kerlatec 2007: 160), presumably as other methods 
for diversion become less viable. The current scale 
of illicit domestic manufacture is unknown, although 
the ACC (2011: 76) lists ‘backyard manufacturers’  
as a source of firearms for SOCG. Given the risks 
associated with detection, illicit manufacture is likely  
to occur in small-scale, made-to-order operations.
Corrupt licensed dealers
Licensed firearm dealers are well placed to divert 
firearms—they have access to large firearm 
collections, and their familiarity with legislation  
and processes around the importation, sale and 
distribution of firearms will have revealed where 
vulnerabilities exist and can be best exploited. This 
form of diversion often relied upon the abuse of 
legislative or administrative inconsistencies and 
weaknesses (such as the deactivation loopholes 
described below), which was nominated as a key 
conduit in the supply of handguns to the illicit 
markets in New South Wales and Queensland  
(ACC 2011; Qld CMC 2004).
Legislative loopholes
The exploitation of legislative and procedural 
loopholes primarily by, although not confined to, 
some corrupt licensed dealers contributed in the 
past to the diversion of reportedly thousands of legal 
firearms, notably handguns (Project stakeholders 
personal communication 24 September 2011;  
30 November 2011). Legislative and procedural 
anomalies recognised as being particularly 
damaging concerned the ‘accountable’ status of 
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deactivated firearms, the definition of a firearm and 
mandatory registration of frames and receivers,  
and the historical non-existent recording of firearms 
transferred across state and territory borders.
Deactivation/reactivation
In all but two jurisdictions, firearms remain 
‘accountable’ even when deactivated. This means 
that a firearm’s registration status is not invalidated  
if it is deactivated and the firearm remains ‘on the 
books’ of the relevant firearm registry. Deactivated 
firearms, however, do not fall within the legislative 
definition of a firearm in South Australia and Western 
Australia. A firearm in these two states loses  
its accountability status on it being certified  
as deactivated. Once a deactivated firearm  
is unaccountable and reactivation occurs, its  
transfer out of the legal pool is complete.
A deactivation loophole in Queensland weapons 
legislation inadvertently led to the deactivation of a 
substantial number of handguns (estimated to be 
upwards of 4,000) by Queensland-based dealers 
and probably the transfer of some of these 
handguns into the national illicit pool (Project 
stakeholders personal communication 24 
September 2011; 30 November 2011). Prior to 
amendments to the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) and 
Weapons Regulation 1996 (Qld), a handgun if 
rendered inoperable lost any requirement to remain 
registered in Queensland. Compounding this 
vulnerability was the lack of inspection of the firearm 
once the deactivation process had taken place. 
Subsequently, many thousands of poorly 
deactivated handguns were reactivated by firearm 
enthusiasts and criminals, and made their way into 
the illicit market (Project stakeholders personal 
communication 24 September 2011; 30 November 
2011).
Technical loopholes
Prior to the implementation of the Firearms 
Amendment (Trafficking) Act 2001 No 24 (NSW),  
a technical error in the definition of a handgun in 
New South Wales legislation enabled the diversion  
of many handguns to the illicit market (Project 
stakeholders personal communication 24 September 
2011; 30 November 2011). The Firearms Act 1996 
(NSW) as originally enacted required firearm barrels, 
but not frames or receivers, to be registered under 
Part 3 (Registration of Firearms) of the Act. The 
exemption of frames and receivers meant handguns 
without barrels could be sold without having to 
observe regulations on firearm disposal, and frames/
receivers could be purchased without need to 
register them. This opened up opportunities to 
convert or build up new handguns using non-
registrable parts purchased in New South Wales 
with parts purchased elsewhere. Among the 
amendments prescribed in the Firearms Amendment 
(Trafficking) Act 2001 No 24 (NSW) was the 
stipulation that registration now ‘applies to every 
firearm frame and firearm receiver in the same way 
as it applies to a firearm’ (s 93(1)).
Interstate transfer
Diversion by interstate transfer is potentially 
facilitated by a mix of legislative and administrative 
loopholes. Until recently, there was no structured 
system agreed to by all state and territories in the 
reconciliation of firearm transactions between 
jurisdictions. Aware of this anomaly, some dealers 
have diverted licit firearms to the illicit market by 
falsely declaring on their dealer returns disposal of 
firearms to other companies or individuals interstate, 
when in fact the firearm never left the dealer’s 
possession. This vulnerability assisted in the intra- 
and inter-state diversion of firearms, predominantly 
handguns.
Illicit market suppliers  
and consumers
The trafficking of illicit firearms in Australia is not 
considered to be organised in structure (Alpers & 
Twyford 2003; Kerlatec 2007; Mouzos 1999; CMC 
2004). Rather, it is dominated by a collection of 
criminal gangs (OMCGs are frequently nominated)  
in which illicit firearm trafficking is run as a side 
business to the primary criminal venture (eg the 
drugs market) and small networks or individual 
operators, such as corrupt licensed dealers, who 
move illicit firearms around by word of mouth.
The consumers of the illicit market comprise much 
the same group again, consisting of persons, gangs 
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or more sophisticated entities acquiring firearms to 
commit crime, for protection of themselves or their 
assets, to perpetuate gang rivalry and violence and/
or for stockpiling purposes. It is fair to assume that 
few, if any, consumers of illicit firearms sit outside 
criminal networks but it is quite probable there are 
collectors or other firearm enthusiasts who might 
look to the illicit market for restricted firearms if they 
wish to acquire them.
There is a predilection for handguns among the 
criminal fraternity, in acquisition and to use to 
commit crime (Blumstein 1995; Braga et al. 2002; 
Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006; Kleck & Wang 
2009; Smith et al. 2010; SOCA 2006; Spapens 
2007; Williams & Poynton 2006; Wright & Rossi 
1994; Wright, Wintermute & Webster 2010). While 
the large-scale, cross-border trafficking franchises 
are occupied with the movement of military-style 
firearms and similar firearms, there is ‘limited use’ for 
such items in domestic criminal enterprise (UNODC 
2010: 129). Military-style firearms (such as Bren 
Light Machine Guns, AK-47 assault rifles, M1 
carbines) do permeate the domestic illicit market  
but they are bought for different reasons (possibly 
stockpiling) and generally do not feature in the 
commission of crime. Handguns dominate firearm-
perpetrated violent crime statistics from the United 
States (FBI 2010), England and Wales (Smith et al. 
2010) and Canada (Mahoney 2011), despite 
differential rates of firearm crime overall in these 
jurisdictions. This has not been the case in New 
Zealand where long-arms were often used in the 
commission of violent crime, but this apparent 
preference for long-arms could be related to the 
comparative scarcity of handguns, compared with 
long-arms, in New Zealand (Newbold 1999). More 
recent data on firearm violent crime in New Zealand, 
however, are not available.
In Australia, the number of victims of firearm-
perpetrated homicide (ie murder and manslaughter) 
has declined by half between 1989–90 and 2009–10 
from 24 to 12 percent (Chan & Payne forthcoming). 
The predominance of handgun-perpetrated 
homicide, as a proportion of all firearm homicide, 
rose from 17 to 45 percent between 1992–93 and 
2006–07 (Bricknell 2008b; Dearden & Jones 2008) 
but dropped again in the following three years to  
a little over 10 percent. For the most recent year 
available (2009–10), handgun homicide comprised 
13 percent of all homicides that were committed 
with a firearm (Chan & Payne forthcoming). Data on 
weapon use from the AIC’s National Armed Robbery 
Monitoring Program show that armed robberies 
involving a firearm comprised 14 percent of all 
armed robberies reported in 2009. This percentage 
has remained stable over the seven year period  
from 2003 to 2010. More than half of all firearm-
perpetrated armed robberies in 2009 were 
committed with a handgun (56%, n=2,708), with 
long-arms used in 10 percent or less of firearm 
armed robberies reported that year (eg shotguns 
10%, n=490; rifles/airguns 5%, n=5; AIC 
unpublished data).
Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006) have 
differentiated between two types of ‘gun culture’  
that sustains the illicit firearms market in England 
and Wales. The first is the instrumental criminal 
firearm culture where firearms are obtained 
specifically for offensive criminal purposes, armed 
robbery being the most common criminal pursuit. 
The second is the complex criminal firearm culture, 
in which firearms are procured for often a mix of 
offensive, defensive and symbolic functions. It is the 
latter group of purchasers that Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone (2006) have argued is becoming the 
dominant culture in illicit firearm ownership and use, 
and that is often connected to, or immersed within, 
the illicit drugs market. This is a credible scenario for 
Australia too and may help to explain the type of 
firearm that comprises the illicit firearm market here.
Handguns, as noted earlier, are the firearm of choice 
for many criminal groups. Handguns are preferred  
by the very fact they are concealable and some 
models have large magazine capacities (Blumstein 
1995; Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006; Lizotte et al. 
2000; Wright & Rossi 1994). Long-arms, in particular 
sawn-off shotguns, are chosen probably because  
of general availability but also because of the 
intimidatory effect they have on victims (Hales, Lewis 
& Silverstone 2006; Newbold 1999). Select-fire 
firearms (ie firearms that have at least 1 automatic 
and semi-automatic mode) hold a ‘symbolic value’ 
among criminal users that ‘conform(s) to gangster 
stereotype(s)’ (Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006: 55); 
their power and quick reloading capacities are 
equally attractive.
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Access to the illicit firearm market, or a broader 
selection of items within the market, usually depends 
on the extent and strength of criminal connections 
and length of service in criminal enterprise (Hales, 
Lewis & Silverstone 2006; Newbold 1999). Older, 
established consumers tend to be more technically 
savvy and more discerning in their choice of firearm. 
Younger or less experienced purchasers may be less 
knowledgeable about firearms and possibly more 
impulsive in their selection (Cook et al. 2006; Hales, 
Lewis & Silverstone 2006).
The reasons for acquiring illicit firearms can be 
related to the ‘gun cultures’ described before. Some 
firearms are bought primarily to commit a criminal 
offence. Others, particularly handguns, are acquired 
for self-defence or protection and, for younger users, 
as status symbols (Blumstein 1995; Bricknell 2008b; 
Cook et al. 2006; Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006; 
Lizotte et al. 2000). Cook et al. (2006) noted that 
gang members often possessed firearms so that 
their rivals knew they had a firearm—just showing 
someone your firearm was sufficient for being left 
alone. Self-defence and the avoidance of future 
victimisation were regularly mentioned reasons for 
firearm ownership by gang members involved in  
the drugs market, particularly those at the retail  
end of the market. Then there are purposes related 
to establishing and maintaining control of illegal 
economic activities (Markowski et al. 2009), such as 
handling territorial disputes and ‘sanctioning’ acts  
of trespass (Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006). Finally, 
there is the acquisition of firearms for stockpiling, to 
be used when and if more serious skirmishes arise. 
Military-style firearms may be more likely to be 
obtained for stockpiling purposes.
Australian cases of  
firearm trafficking
The nature of firearm trafficking in Australia can  
be discerned from examining open-source material 
but with the caveat that the absence of intelligence 
prevents the construction of a more complete 
picture. As noted earlier, there is a paucity of 
open-source literature addressing the illicit firearm 
trade within Australia, indeed on firearms in general, 
outside the occasional report (usually) prepared by 
government agencies or interest groups. The 
Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission’s 
assessment of the illicit firearms trade in Queensland 
in the early 2000s described the market as ‘not large 
or overly organised’ and was mostly supplied, at 
least in the past, by the diversion of firearms from 
the legal market, ‘boosted by opportunistic theft’ 
(Qld CMC 2004: 203).
Similarly dated assessments of firearm trafficking 
(Alpers & Twyford 2003; Mouzos 1999) supported 
the opinion that the illicit market was not organised 
and supply was predominantly from ‘domestic 
leakage’ of legal firearms, rather than wholesale 
illegal importation. A more recent report, on firearm 
trafficking in New South Wales (Kerlatec 2007),  
listed diversion, a growing industry in domestic 
manufacture (presumably unlawful), and illegal 
importation as methods of supply, although it also 
predicted an increase in the use and acquisition by 
criminal elements of imitation and replica firearms. 
The ACC (2011: 76), in its 2011 assessment of 
organised crime in Australia, stated that the 
trafficking in firearms is largely furnished by ‘corrupt 
licensed dealers, loose networks of criminal gangs 
and ‘backyard’ manufacturers’ but did not predict 
any escalation in activity into the near future.
Missing from these more generalised accounts of 
firearm trafficking is the identity and backgrounds of 
suppliers and consumers, and specificities around 
the type of firearms that are bought and sold. Media 
reports can only go so far in revealing these 
identities, not least because this form of source 
material may tend to focus on the more substantial 
(or sensationalist) cases (eg see AAP & Davies 2012; 
ABC 2012, 2009; Bell 2008; Earley 2009; Hughes 
2007; Nankervis 2012; Nicholson & Ziffer 2004; 
O’Brien 2007; Robertson 2011; Rule 2009; 
Trembath 2009; Trenwith 2009). From these, it is 
clear that some trafficking syndicates have access to 
significant caches of (usually) restricted firearms (and 
other weapons) and the link to OMCGs and other 
criminal groups involved in the drugs trade is readily 
advanced. The role of licensed firearm dealers and 
armourers is also apparent, either as a channel by 
which firearms are moved into the illegal market or 
as on-sellers. However, the scenarios presented in 
these reports simply confirm stereotypes around 
firearm trafficking without detailing the different 
typologies of involvement. The following discussion 
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examines transcripts from court proceedings to 
ascertain whether more can be established from  
this source about suppliers and different levels of 
trafficking enterprise.
The ‘business of selling’
Among the recommendations specified in the 
National Firearm Trafficking Policy Agreement (2002) 
was the introduction into law of new offences or an 
increase in penalties for activities connected with  
the illicit firearms trade. These were described in full 
in the previous section but briefly include, where they 
were not present in the legislation before:
•	 the creation of offences related to the defacement 
of identifying marks (eg serial numbers) and the 
illegal manufacture of firearms;
•	 an increase in penalties for illegal possession;
•	 new provisions for licensed dealers in the 
recording, reporting and inspection of firearm part 
transactions and close associate arrangements; 
and
•	 the addition of an offence for employing a 
prohibited person in a dealership business.
The sample of court proceedings assembled for this 
report was expectedly small (n=20) and therefore  
the description of illicit firearm sales contained in 
these transcripts can only be taken as indicative  
of trafficking operations. As noted in the Methods 
section, court proceedings are generally available 
only for cases heard in higher courts and those 
cases reported here were mostly those that went  
to appeal. It was not possible to establish the 
proportion of cases that proceeded to prosecution 
that were represented by the cases described here. 
Indeed, a number of high profile firearm trafficking 
cases reported in the media in recent years could 
not be located in publicly available court records.
Two categories of suppliers might be distinguished 
from the compiled cases. The first category 
comprised individuals or groups of individuals who 
were evidently in the ‘business of selling’—the sale 
or supply of firearms was a regular or major form  
of income, at least for a sustained period of time. 
These suppliers were known or suspected to have 
engaged in multiple, illegal sales of firearms, usually 
restricted models, to persons who did not have the 
appropriate licence to own the firearms being 
disposed of or were designated a ‘prohibited 
person’ under the relevant state or territory law.  
For example, in The Queen v NP [2003] NSWCCA 
195 (17 July 2003), the defendant was described as 
clearly ‘being in the business of supplying firearms 
[and prohibited drugs]’ and that ‘business had been 
good and profitable’ (Transcript of proceedings, The 
Queen v NP, New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Hodgson JA, 17 July 2003: 8). In a number 
of cases, the appeals judge represented the 
seriousness of the matter with the defendant’s 
apparent disregard for the identity of the eventual 
purchaser of the firearm or the reason for the 
purchase. In The Queen v Nash [2008] SASC 48  
(29 February 2008), Justice David noted it was ‘clear 
that the respondent acquired the firearms illegally’ 
and on the respondent’s plea the act of sale ‘was 
made on the basis of recklessness, it [was] difficult 
to imagine that these firearms were to be used by 
the purchasers for anything other than a sinister 
purpose’ (Transcript of proceedings, The Queen v 
Nash, Supreme Court of South Australia, David JJ, 
29 February 2008: 127).
Nash had been found guilty of taking part in the 
supply of a prescribed firearm (an Uzi 9mm 
submachine gun), 12 Category H firearms (6 
handguns on 2 separate occasions) and two 
Category D firearms, contrary to s 14A(1)(b) of the 
Firearms Act 1977 (SA). Similarly, in The Queen v 
Dunn [2003] NSWCCA 169 (13 August 2003), in 
which it was determined in the sentence hearing that 
40 firearms had been illegally sold, Justice Meagher, 
while acknowledging the specifics of the sale(s) were 
not established, stated ‘one might be forgiven for 
speculating that the purposes were hardly likely  
to be benign or the participants to be savoury’ 
(Transcript of proceedings, The Queen v Dunn,  
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, 
Meagher ACJ, 13 August 2003: 19).
The sale of firearms to persons who had the 
intention of taking firearms to a state other than the 
jurisdiction of sale informed in part the decision to 
dismiss the appeal in The Queen v Howard [2004] 
NSWCCA 348 (12 October 2004). In this case,  
the offender, who lived in Queensland, had sold  
two handguns and was offering to sell another  
two handguns with silencers (contrary to s 51(1A)  
of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW)), to a buyer (an 
undercover police officer) who had made it known  
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to the offender he was from New South Wales and 
intended to take the firearms back across the 
border. While the offender had no previous criminal 
history, the appeals judge agreed with the district 
court judge’s summation that:
…like others of his ilk, he regards personal 
financial gain as of more importance than the 
safety of the community. I am totally satisfied that 
he knew exactly what he was doing; that he was 
deeply steeped in his love for firearms and felt no 
sense of responsibility, so long as he did not pull 
the trigger (Transcript of proceedings, The Queen 
v Howard, New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Spigelman CJ (citing Ducker ADCJ): 8).
The second category of supplier could be defined as 
part-time vendors, who sold firearms on a more ad 
hoc basis. While involvement in the drug market, 
either as a user or dealer, was not unique to this 
group of suppliers, the available cases suggest that 
the sale of firearms were for these offenders, a 
means to support an existing drug habit or a minor 
side-business to dealing in drugs. In Baxter v the 
Queen [2007] NSWCCA 237 (10 August 2007), the 
respondent was described as a heavy drug user 
who purchased and sold amphetamine and 
methylamphetamine. Telephone intercepts indicated 
the offender was also occasionally occupied in 
sourcing and selling firearms; he was convicted, 
along with drug offences, for the sale of a shotgun, 
contrary to s 51(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), 
as well as possession of a replica Smith & Wesson 
handgun, contrary to s 7(1) of the Act. Supporting  
a drug habit was the primary factor in the illegal sale 
of firearms in Regina v Justin Van Turnhout [2007] 
NSWDC 363 (9 November 2007). The firearms the 
respondent sold were his own or that of a friend, 
rather than items acquired elsewhere, which he sold 
along with various quantities of methylamphetamine. 
Joint sales of firearms with prohibited drugs is also 
described in The Queen v DJM [2002] NSWCCH 
493 (9 December 2002), in which a self-
acknowledged drug dealer was involved, on  
two separate occasions, in the sale of heroin  
and semi-automatic pistols to a police operative.
A separate group of participants involved in the illicit 
movement of firearms are those not directly involved 
in the selling of firearms, or the procurement of 
firearms for sale, but rather engaged in the exchange 
or receipt of firearms in return for another illegal 
commodity. In The Queen v Gasmier [2011] 
SASCFC 43 (20 May 2011), it was noted that ‘the 
appellant was sentenced on the basis that he had 
been approached by a friend who asked him to  
take the guns and ‘move them on’, in exchange  
for drugs’ (Transcript of proceedings, The Queen v 
Gasmier, Supreme Court of South Australia (Court  
of Criminal Appeal), Sulan JD: 5). The firearms were 
a Category A 12-gauge single barrel shotgun and a 
Category D .22 calibre semi-automatic rifle, which 
were located in the boot of the appellant’s car. 
Similarly, in Howlett v Tasmania [2010] TASCCA 15 
(12 October 2010), the appellant was shown to have 
been involved in the exchange of drugs for firearms, 
in this case brokering the exchange of two ounces 
of methlyamphetamine for five firearms. The 
appellant was to receive one of the five firearms  
as commission; he was ultimately not charged with 
an offence contrary to s 110A of the Firearms Act 
1996 (Tas) (unlawful trafficking in firearms). However, 
the appellant’s ‘motive’ for possessing the 
methylamphetamine—‘to facilitate the crime of 
trafficking in firearms’—was noted at sentencing and 
in the subsequent appeal as an influential factor for 
sentencing purposes (Transcript of proceedings, 
Howlett v Tasmania, Supreme Court of Tasmania 
(Court of Criminal Appeal), Blow: 16).
Sale items
The origin of the trafficked firearms was not 
commonly stated in appeal proceedings. Theft was 
cited as the source of firearms in R v Mundy [2011] 
QCA 217 (2 September 2011) (55 firearms stolen 
from an Ipswich dealer), R v Anderson [1998] QCA 
272 (11 September 1998) (theft of 45 firearms from 
a residential property) and R v Nash [2008] SASC 48 
(29 February 2008) (firearm specifics and quantity 
not cited) but outside these and the handful of  
cases regarding import offences, the method by 
which the firearm was trafficked was not known  
or only inferred. It was evident that all but a few  
of the firearms listed were unregistered.
Where information was available regarding the 
firearms offered for sale or sold, the great majority 
were handguns, mostly semi-automatic pistols. 
Other, less commonly tendered items were Category 
D semi-automatic rifles, submachine guns and a mix 
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of restricted and less restricted (eg Category A bolt 
action rifles) long-arms. In incidents of trafficking 
categorised above as involving the more ‘committed’ 
seller, the serial numbers and other identifying features 
on the vended firearms (again, predominantly 
semi-automatic pistols) had been defaced or 
obliterated and some of the pistols had been 
modified for or were fitted with silencers (eg The 
Queen v NP [2003] NSWCCA 195 (17 July 2003); 
The Queen v Dunn [2003] NSWCCA 169 (13 August 
2003); The Queen v Howard [2004] NSWCCA 348 
(12 October 2004); The Queen v Nash [2008] SASC 
48 (29 February 2008); The Queen v Mundy [2011] 
QCA 217 (2 September 2011); Samac v The Queen 
[2011] VSCA 171 (17 June 2011). Evidence of 
long-arm modification—shortening of the barrel  
and/or the stock to render the firearm (more) 
concealable—was described in Regina v Justin Van 
Turnhout [2007] NSWDC 363 (9 November 2007); 
The Queen v Dogan [2011] NSWDC 86 (28 July 
2011); and Yammine v The Queen [2010] NSWCCA 
123 (23 June 2010). Many of these firearms were 
loaded at the time of sale, or when located, and 
ammunition and/or magazines were generally 
proffered with the sale item.
Warehousing
A number of trafficking cases revealed that suppliers 
(or potential suppliers) stored or had access to 
substantial numbers of firearms. In The Queen v 
Mark Isaac Shane Brown [2006] NSWCCA 249  
(17 August 2006), the offender was described  
as a ‘warehouser’ of prohibited weapons, contrary 
to s 51D(2) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) 
(unauthorised possession of prohibited firearms  
or pistols in aggravated circumstances). The 
warehousing of firearms also formed the charges 
referred to in Yammine v The Queen [2010] 
NSWCCA (23 June 2010) where seven prohibited 
firearms were found on the appellant’s property, 
allegedly accumulated due to a build-up of tension 
between rival OMCGs.
Similar stockpiling of firearms was described in The 
Queen v Henderson and Warwick [2009] VSCA 136 
(16 June 2009) and DPP v Fleiner [2010] VSCA 143 
(18 June 2010). In the former case, a search warrant 
executed on a storage unit frequented by the 
appellants discovered seven firearms, five of which 
were unregistered. The amount located was less 
than the 10 stipulated under s 7C of the Firearms 
Act 1996 (Vic) (ie possession of a traffickable 
quantity of firearms) but the appellants, who were 
convicted of drug trafficking offences, were both 
prohibited persons as defined under the Act and 
hence disqualified from owning any type of firearm. 
An explanation for the firearms was not provided at 
the appeal hearing.
In DPP v Fleiner [2010] VSCA 143 (18 June 2010), 
the respondent concerned, also designated a 
prohibited person for the purposes of s 5 of the 
Firearms Act 1996 (Vic), was found to have amassed 
45 unregistered firearms, a ‘large amount’ of 
ammunition and ‘dozens’ of firearm parts. The 
respondent’s counsel in the sentence hearing 
described the firearms as collector’s items, to which 
the Crown demurred, arguing ‘this number in one 
place could accurately be described…as an arsenal’ 
(Transcript of proceedings, DPP v Fleiner, Supreme 
Court of Victoria (Court of Appeal), Harper J (citing 
the Crown): 29). While the respondent pleaded guilty 
to an offence against s 7C of the Firearms Act 1996 
(Vic), along with various offences related to the 
possession and trafficking of a drug of dependence, 
there was no evidence the owner was vending the 
firearms nor where they were obtained from.
The vulnerability of warehoused firearms, even if 
amassed by persons with no apparent ‘sinister 
intent’, underlined the case in The Queen v Cromarty 
(2004) NSWCCA 54 (22 March 2004) and highlights 
the grey area between the accumulation and 
possession of large numbers of firearms and 
trafficking. The firearm collection at the centre of  
this case was described as the ‘largest cache of 
weapons ever taken from a private individual in 
Australia’ (Transcript of proceedings, The Queen  
v Cromarty, New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Kirby J: 11). Among the firearms collected 
by the respondent were 35 firearms prohibited under 
Schedule 1 of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW), 103 
unregistered firearms, 10 pistols on which the serial 
number had been defaced, two shortened self-
loading rifles, 147 firearm parts, 2,850 cartridges of 
ammunition and seven silencers for rifles and pistols. 
The firearms were distributed throughout the house 
and garage and none were secured according to 
legal requirements. Among the five counts Cromarty 
pleaded guilty to was the unauthorised possession 
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of firearms in aggravated circumstances, contrary  
to s 51D(2) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW).
The respondent, who had a dealer’s licence and 
licences to possess Category A, B and H firearms, 
was not thought to have been involved in the 
trafficking of illegal firearms; however, ‘he was 
certainly conscious of his obligations under each 
Act, and understood the security risk that he ran’ (at 
55) by cultivating such a large collection of firearms. 
In considering the appeal against sentence from the 
Crown, Justice Kirby stated:
…although the primary object of s 51D…may 
have been the punishment of criminals who 
warehouse illegal firearms, the objective was, I 
believe, broader than that. The measures…were 
‘designed to inhibit the illegal supply of firearms’. 
The purpose of the amendments extended to  
the stockpiling of weapons, as happened here, 
where that stockpile was vulnerable and, if 
violated, may feed the market in the illegal supply 
of firearms (Transcript of proceedings, The Queen 
v Cromarty, New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal, Kirby J: 86).
Conclusion
Past descriptions of the illicit firearm market in 
Australia have suggested the market is not highly 
organised and combines the activities of criminal 
gangs trafficking in firearms as sideline commerce 
and individual players (such as corrupt dealers) who 
organise illegal sales (or diversion of firearms) on a 
personal-order basis. This general depiction is more 
or less confirmed based on what can be ascertained 
from other open-source materials although the cast 
of suppliers is not as neatly defined. It includes those 
who utilise the sourcing and sale of illicit firearms as 
a major (rather than secondary) form of revenue; 
those with no formal links to trafficking networks but 
who move or broker the occasional sale of a firearm, 
often as part of a drug transaction; and provisional 
contributors who act based on need (eg to support 
a drug habit). Handguns, mostly semi-automatic 
pistols, appear to be the primary commodity, 
supplemented with military-style long-arms (such as 
Category D semi-automatic rifles) and less restricted 
long-arms. The differentiation in activity likely reflects 
a combination of factors, including sophistication  
in the establishment of networks of access and 
supply, the types of customers, product volume 
available and consumer preferences.
The illicit firearm consumer in Australia is not so 
easily drawn from the literature cited, although they 
may match those described by Cook et al. (2006) 
and Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006), with 
firearms acquired for offensive and defensive 
functions, to instil status and to amass arsenals. 
What is not clear is the extent of consumption by 
persons not engaged in criminal activity but who 
have looked to the illicit market to obtain their 
firearms. The presence of the grey market probably 
offsets some acquisition of long-arms from the illicit 
pool but handguns, if denied to consumers through 
legal avenues, are generally only available from the 
illegal supply.
Numerous sources for illicit firearms have been 
identified, yet different commentators have elevated 
the relative importance of these in stocking the illicit 
market. The contribution of legislative loopholes  
and stolen firearms is probably the least disputed  
of these sources, although more could be learned 
about the incidence of genuine targeted theft 
incidents versus opportunistic theft (ie where an 
array of goods found by the offender are stolen  
with the firearms). Other sources, such as illegal 
importation, illicit domestic manufacture and the role 
of corrupt dealers are less clear, not so much 
because their contribution is necessarily considered 
negligible but because evidence is not as complete, 
is not publicly available or is largely anecdotal, is less 
likely to be detected, or is a combination of these.  
A clearer understanding of the relative importance  
of different avenues of supply could be used not just 
to determine the success of targeted responses (eg 
the closing of legislative loopholes) but potentially  
to predict future vulnerabilities and changes in the 
dominance of supply pathways.
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General firearm 
characteristics
A total of 2,750 seized firearms were recorded in the 
NFTD as of March 2012 (see Methods in first section 
on the compilation of this data). Where information 
was recorded on the date of seizure (n=2,341),  
all but 10 were seized between June 2002 and 
October 2011. Of the 10 that were recovered earlier, 
one was seized in 1977 and the others between 
1995 and 1999.
Of these seized firearms, 43 percent (n=1,184)  
were rifles, 34 percent (n=960) were handguns and 
16 percent (n=448) were shotguns (see Table 7). 
Only a small number of prohibited machine gun 
models have been recorded, comprising less than 
one percent (n=26) of all seized firearms. Some of 
these firearms were seized as part of multiple-firearm 
recovery events, but the quality of the data 
precluded determining how many firearms were 
seized individually or as part of a larger assemblage 
and what these multiple seizures consisted of. The 
largest number of firearms seized as a collection was 
102, recovered in New South Wales from individuals 
involved in firearms trafficking. Other larger seizures 
There has been considerable speculation in the 
public sphere, particularly in response to apparent 
increases in drive-by shootings and other gang-
related shooting offences, on the nature of the illicit 
firearms market in Australia, specifically the sources 
of these firearms. However, little formal examination 
of what this market comprises, how it is replenished 
and its relationship to SOCG has been available to 
test this speculation. This lack of analysis is partly 
due to universal difficulties in quantifying and 
describing illicit good markets, particularly in the 
absence of comprehensive information sources.
The best available data to assist in the construction 
of the illicit firearms market in Australia is that 
compiled by the ACC on seized firearms. Using 
analysis of data from the ACC’s NFTD, this section 
describes the characteristics of firearms found in the 
illicit market, where these firearms originated and the 
means by which these firearms ended up in the illicit 
market. The section focuses on firearms acquired  
by SOCG (see Table 1 for a definition of serious  
and organised crime), the prevalence of prohibited 
firearms in SOCG caches and whether similar 
patterns of supply to the illicit market are used for 
restricted and non-restricted models. 
Illicit market firearms 
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Table 7 Firearm type seized from SOCG and non-SOCGa
SOCG Non-SOCG All
Firearm type n % n % n %
Rifle 672 40 512 49 1,184 43
Shotgun 278 16 170 16 448 16
Air rifle 48 3 58 6 106 4
Handgun 665 39 295 28 960 34
Other 26 2 10 1 36 1
Sub-machine gun 16 1 3 <1 19 <1
Light machine gun 4 <1 2 <1 6 <1
Heavy machine gun 0 0 1 <1 1 <1
Combination firearm 6 <1 4 <1 10 <1
Unknown 12 1 4 <1 16 1
Total 1,701 1,049 2,750
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
Figure 1 Firearm category (%)a
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associated with SOCG included the recovery of 85, 
45 and 35 firearms, all from entities involved in the 
illicit drugs market, and 60 firearms from a firearms 
trafficking venture. There was a small group of large 
seizures from non-SOCG too—55 unregistered 
long-arms from a licensed firearm owner in New 
South Wales and seizures of 21 and 22 grey 
market-sourced long-arms from individuals in 
Queensland.
Similar proportions of rifles (40%) and handguns 
(39%) were recorded from SOCG seizures, while in 
non-SOCG seizures, rifles were significantly more 
commonly recovered (and hence it can be assumed 
more commonly acquired) than handguns (49% of 
all firearms seized compared with 28% respectively; 
χ2 =35.26 df=2 p<0.01). SOCG and non-SOCG 
seizures contrasted solely in the prevalence of 
handguns, with a significantly greater proportion  
of handguns found in association with SOCG.
Both SOCG and non-SOCG firearms were 
disproportionately skewed towards restricted firearm 
categories (ie Category C, D and H firearms as 
classified in the National Firearms Agreement (1996); 
see Figure 1 and Table 8). Category C and D 
long-arms comprise self-loading (ie semi-automatic 
and automatic) rifles and pump action shotguns  
that were subject to the 1996 gun buybacks and 
Category H comprise handguns. Altogether, Category 
C, D and H firearms make up less than 10 percent 
of all registered firearms in Australia but comprised 
over 50 percent of all seized firearms. This skew 
towards restricted models was significantly more 
marked among firearms seized from SOCG, where 
61 percent of all seized firearms were Category C, D 
or H compared with 44 percent of non-SOCG 
firearms (χ2=78.2 df=2 p<0.01).
Category H handguns comprised the largest 
proportion of restricted firearms in both SOCG and 
non-SOCG seized firearms but, as described earlier, 
were significantly more prevalent among firearms 
recovered from the former group. There was little 
difference in the percentage of Category C firearms 
between SOCG and non-SOCG but the proportion 
of Category D firearms seized from SOCG (15%) 
was almost double that of non-SOCG firearms (9%).
Thirty different firearm types were seized from  
SOCG and non-SOCG alike and, while there were 
similarities in the predominance of specific firearm 
Table 8 Firearm classification according to the National Firearms Agreement 1996
Category A
Air rifles
Rimfire rifles (excluding self-loading)
Single- and double-barrelled shotguns
Category B
Muzzle-loading firearms
Single shot, double-barrelled and repeating action centre-fire rifles
Break-action shotgun/rifle combinations
Category C (Prohibited except for occupational purposes)
Self-loading rimfire rifles with a magazine capacity no greater than 10 rounds
Self-loading shotguns with a magazine capacity no greater than five rounds
Pump-action shotguns with a magazine capacity no greater than five rounds
Category D (Prohibited except for official purposes)
Self-loading centre-fire rifles
Self-loading shotguns and pump-action shotguns with a capacity of more than five rounds
Self-loading rimfire rifles with a magazine capacity greater than 10 rounds
Category H
All handguns, including air pistols
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types in both groups, the proportional composition 
was significantly different between the two 
(χ2=135.13 df=2 p<0.01). Just over a quarter (26%, 
n=436) of all SOCG-seized firearms were semi-
automatic pistols and 15 percent each were bolt 
action rifles (either Category A or B, n=255) and 
restricted semi-automatic rifles (either Category C  
or D, n=253; see Figure 2). Semi-automatic pistols 
and semi-automatic rifles were also among the more 
common firearms seized in non-SOCG contexts, 
making up 18 percent (n=191) and 11 percent 
(n=116) of all non-SOCG firearms (see Figure 3).  
Bolt action rifles, the most widely held rifle type 
among legal owners, were the most common firearm 
type recovered from non-SOCG (21%, n=217).
Defacement or obliteration of serial numbers is used 
to conceal the identity of a firearm (eg if used to 
commit a violent crime or stolen from a victim of 
violent crime such as armed robbery) and disguise 
the method of diversion. A total of 542 firearms or  
a fifth of all firearms seized were recorded as having 
the serial number defaced. Three-quarters of these 
were handguns, possibly reflecting the long-
prescribed legal requirement for handgun registration 
and hence the impetus to conceal the identity of 
items leaving the licit market. Although the difference 
was not statistically significant, of note is that the 
larger percentage of firearms (53%) with defaced 
serial numbers was seized from non-SOCG.
Other, typical modifications come in the form of 
shortening or converting long-arms to produce  
a handgun-like model. Around one in 10 (9%) of 
seized long-arms had undergone a category change 
(to Category H), the overwhelming majority of which 
(77%) were found in the possession of SOCG. When 
it can physically be achieved, shortening the barrel 
and butt stock of a firearm makes it easier for 
criminals to conceal it in the commission of crimes. 
One seized semi-automatic rifle had been modified 
to a Category R firearm as classified under the 
Weapons Categories Regulation 1997 (Qld). While 
the specifics of this conversion were not available  
in the data, Category R weapons include fully 
automatic machine or submachine guns.
Figure 2 Firearm action typea—SOCG (%)b
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a:  PSA=semi-automatic pistol; RBA=bolt action rifle; RSA=semi-automatic rifle; REV=revolver; SSB=single barrel shotgun; RSS=single shot rifle; SPA=pump 
action shotgun; RLA=lever action rifle; SDB=double barrel shotgun
b: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Note: Excludes unknown action type (n=12)
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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Restricted firearms
Through the National Firearms Agreement (1996), 
states and territories amended their firearms 
legislation to restrict the importation and use of 
military-style automatic and semi-automatic firearms 
to designated occupational and official purposes. 
Firearms now restricted are:
•	 self-loading automatic or semi-automatic rimfire 
rifles;
•	 self-loading automatic or semi-automatic centre 
fire rifles;
•	 self-loading shotguns; and
•	 pump action shotguns.
The National Firearms Agreement (1996) was 
accompanied by a 12 month firearms amnesty and 
compensation scheme whereby owners and dealers 
were compensated for the surrender of newly 
restricted firearms. Approximately 642,000 firearms 
were surrendered during this period.
New restrictions around the ownership and use  
of handguns were brought in with the National 
Handgun Control Agreement (2002). Restricted 
handguns were any model that had:
•	 a calibre greater than .38”; or
•	 a minimum barrel length of less than 120mm for 
semi-automatic handguns or less than 100mm  
for revolvers and single shot pistols; or
•	 a magazine capacity of greater than 10 rounds.
Approval for handguns with a calibre of .45” may  
be granted for use in specialised accredited sporting 
events. A six month nationwide handgun buyback 
was held between 1 July 2003 and 1 January 2004 
to primarily compensate owners of registered 
handguns rendered restricted by the new laws. An 
amnesty was run concurrently for unlicensed owners 
or owners of unregistered handguns.
Restricted long-arms and handguns
Restricted long-arms are defined here as any 
long-arm denoted in the NFTD as being subject to 
the 1996 buyback. Altogether, 529 or 30 percent  
of all seized long-arms recorded in the NFTD were 
Figure 3 Firearm action typea—non-SOCG (%)b
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Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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Figure 4 Firearm action type of restricted long-armsa (%)
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a:  RSA=semi-automatic rifle; SPA=pump action shotgun; SSA=semi-automatic shotgun; SMG=submachine gun; Other includes select fire rifle, light machine 
gun and heavy machine gun
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
Table 9 Firearms by category and action type of restricted long-arms by SOCG status
SOCG Non-SOCG
Category n % n %
C 122 33 72 45
D 246 67 89 55
Total 368 161
Action typea n % n %
RSA 253 69 115 71
SPA 64 17 31 20
SSA 26 7 6 3
SMG 16 4 3 2
RSF 5 1 3 2
LMG 4 1 2 1
HMG 0 0 1 1
Total 368 161
a:  RSA=semi-automatic rifle; SPA=pump action shotgun; SSA=semi-automatic shotgun; SMG=submachine gun; RSF=select fire rifle; LMG=light machine gun, 
HMG=heavy machine gun
Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
39Illicit market firearms and organised crime 
restricted long-arms. The majority of these restricted 
long-arms were Category D firearms (63%, n=335), 
which are prohibited under Australian law except  
for official purposes (mostly related to animal control 
and welfare). Semi-automatic rifles comprised  
70 percent (n=368) of these restricted long-arms 
and pump action shotguns a much less prevalent  
18 percent (n=95; see Figure 4).
Restricted long-arms were predominantly associated 
with SOCG—70 percent (n=368) of all restricted 
long-arms were seized from entities associated with 
serious and organised crime. The composition of 
restricted long-arm types in SOCG and non-SOCG 
seizures was comparable and the majority of 
restricted long-arms (mostly semi-automatic rifles) 
were highly restricted Category D firearms, but  
the proportions of these were significantly greater 
among SOCG seizures (67% compared with 55%; 
see Table 9). Two-thirds (77%, n=194) of semi-
automatic rifles seized from SOCG were classified  
as Category D firearms compared with 62 percent 
(n=72) of non-SOCG semi-automatic rifles.
Restricted handguns are defined as any handgun 
denoted in the NFTD as being subject to the 2003 
handgun buyback (ie they had a calibre greater  
than 38”, a barrel length shorter than the length 
prescribed and/or a magazine capacity greater than 
10 rounds). Compared with long-arms, a much 
higher proportion of recovered handguns were 
restricted models (65%, (n=631) compared with  
the 30% for long-arms). Most (68%) of these 631 
restricted handguns were seized from SOCG. 
Semi-automatic pistols were favoured by SOCG  
and non-SOCG alike, making up 72 and 74 percent 
respectively of seized restricted handguns (see Table 
10). Revolvers comprised around a fifth of restricted 
handguns for SOCG, as they did for non-SOCG.
Another way of differentiating the acquisition of 
restricted firearms by SOCG and non-SOCG  
entities is to compare the proportions these firearms 
represent in the individual firearm pools. With regard 
to handguns, around two-thirds of all handguns 
seized from SOCG were restricted forms (65%) as 
was the case for handguns seized from non-SOCG 
(67%). This suggests that, while most restricted 
handguns were associated with SOCG, as  
stated above, either there was no overwhelming 
predilection for restricted models by SOCG entities 
or access to restricted models was equally open  
to both SOCG and non-SOCG buyers. However,  
a different pattern emerges with long-arms. Over a 
third (36%) of all SOCG long-arms were restricted 
models, significantly higher than the 21 percent 
found for non-SOCG long-arms (χ2=43.3 df=2 
p<0.01).
Restricted ammunition
As noted under Methods, attempts were made to 
acquire data on the import of 25 ACP, 32 ACP  
and 380 ACP ammunition, calibres of ammunition 
that can only be used in SPPs, a restricted handgun 
model that is attractive to criminals due to its small 
size. SPPs are also manufactured in other calibres 
but as ammunition for these SPPs can be used in 
other firearms (such as rifles) the actual quantity of 
Table 10 Firearm category and action type of restricted handguns by SOCG statusa
Action type
SOCG Non-SOCG
n % n %
PSA 311 72 148 74
REV 95 22 39 20
PSS 13 3 4 2
BPR 7 2 3 2
Other 5 1 6 3
Total 431 200
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Note: PSA=semi-automatic pistol REV=revolver PSS=single shot pistol BPR=black powder revolve Other=air pistol, black powder pistol, derringer, double barrel 
pistol, multi barrel pistol
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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ammunition associated with the use of SPPs cannot 
be identified. A total of 143 SPPs chambered for 
these calibres were seized, 63 percent (n=90) of 
which were denoted as SOCG seizures. Issues with 
the quality of import and registration data collected 
in the NFTD (see below) prevents determining when 
these SPPs entered the country (ie before or after 
the 2002 handgun reforms) or whether the import 
was legal or not.
An examination of quantities of ammunition seized 
by police (n=62,133 rounds) found the most common 
ammunition calibres recovered were .22 (rimfire; 
44% n=27,587), followed by .30 calibre (7.62mm; 
13% n=8,211), .38 calibre (9mm; 12% n=7,597)  
and 12 Gauge (10%, n=6,359). Of the .32 calibre 
ammunition seized (n=2,065; 3% of all ammunition 
seizures), 63% was restricted 32 ACP. Almost all of 
the .25 calibre ammunition, which made up just  
one percent (n=838) of all ammunition seizures, was 
restricted calibre 25 ACP (90%). Of the 27 cases 
that involved the use or ownership of a pistol 
chambered for one of these calibre, 10 were seized 
from individuals charged with drug offences, another 
10 for the commission of a violent crime (homicide 
and armed robbery), six from individuals involved  
in the supply of a prohibited firearms and one for  
a drive-by shooting.
Firearms among outlaw  
motorcycle gangs
OMCGs are involved in a variety of illicit markets, 
including the stockpiling and trafficking of illicit 
firearms (ACC 2011, 2008). Just 218 of the illicit 
firearms recorded in the NFTD were recovered from 
OMCGs, 13 percent of all SOCG firearms and eight 
percent of all seized firearms recorded in the NFTD.
Handguns were more common among OMCG-
recovered firearms (55%) than among firearms 
recovered from SOCG in general (39%). Semi-
automatic pistols were not just the handgun  
of choice but the firearm of choice for OMCGs— 
40 percent of the firearms recovered from OMCGs 
were semi-automatic pistols. Semi-automatic rifles 
and revolvers each comprised less than half the 
number of semi-automatic pistol numbers seized 
Figure 5 Source or method of diversion for restricted long-arms (%)
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Note: Excludes unknown source or method of diversion (n=62)
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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from OMCGs. Eighty-two percent (n=73) of these 
semi-automatic handguns were restricted models, 
significantly higher than the proportion found for 
SOCG more generally and non-SOCG. Long-arms 
were correspondingly a less prevalent item (45%)  
but 50 percent of these were restricted models.
Source of illicit firearms
The grey market, as described earlier, comprises 
long-arms that should have been registered or 
surrendered, depending on the restricted status  
of the firearm, following the 1996 firearm reforms. 
Grey market firearms were the main source of both 
restricted (92%) and non-restricted (86%) long-arms 
(see Figures 5 and 6). Where recognised forms of 
diversion had been identified, theft was the most 
common method of transfer, although accounting for 
just 10 percent of non-restricted long-arms and four 
percent of restricted long-arms seized from the illicit 
market. Other methods of supply included illicit 
domestic manufacture, false deactivation, failure to 
notify interstate transfer of a long-arm and illegal 
import—but only for a few of the seized long-arms 
recorded in the NFTD.
The data on the source or method of diversion for 
restricted and non-restricted handguns returned  
very high unknown responses rates (70% and 68% 
respectively). This is problematic on two levels:
•	 the relative importance of trafficking pathways 
described below may be skewed, producing an 
over-or underestimation of probable supply routes; 
and
•	 it emphasises where there has been a failure to 
record or retain relevant tracing information. Some 
degree of caution is hence required when 
interpreting this data.
The sources of restricted handguns, and the means 
by which they were trafficked, stand in contrast  
to those found for long-arms and reveal the role 
exploitable legislative provisions had in facilitating  
the transfer of handguns into the illicit market. False 
deactivation (39%) and theft or loss of (31%) were 
the primary sources of restricted handguns that had 
entered the illicit market where a method of diversion 
was known (see Figure 7). Other less common forms 
Figure 6 Source or method of diversion for non-restricted long-arms (%)
Othera 2.1
Theft/loss 11.8
Grey market 86.1
a: Other includes failure to notify interstate transfer, diversion by reporting false loss and nfa (n=9)
n=1,098
Note: Excludes unknown source or method of diversion (n=158)
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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Figure 7 Source or method of diversion for restricted handguns (%)
Othera 8.8
Illegal import 3.6
Diversion false export 3.6
Failure to notify receipt 5.2
Domestic manufacture 8.2
Theft/loss 31.4
Deactivation 39.2
a:  Other includes diversion by false theft, diversion by false frame, failure to notify interstate transfer, serial number transfer, theft staged, diversion nfa and 
information pending (n=17)
n=194
Note: Excludes unknown source or method of diversion (n=301)
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
Figure 8 Source or method of diversion for non-restricted handguns (%)
Othera 17.4
Domestic manufacture 11.6
Theft/loss 50.0
Deactivation 21.0
a:  Other includes diversion false export, diversion by spare frame, failure to notify disposal or false disposal notice, failure to notify interstate transfer, illegal 
import, false loss claim and diversion nfa, (n=24)
n=138
Note: Excludes unknown source or method of diversion (n=136)
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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of diversion collectively made up around a fifth of  
all seized restricted handguns and included illicit 
domestic manufacture (mainly of single shot pen 
guns), dealers failing to record the receipt of a 
handgun or diverting handguns through false export 
claims and illegal import.
Theft or loss, rather than false deactivation, was  
the primary method of supply for non-restricted 
handguns—50 percent (n=69) of all non-restricted 
handguns were items stolen from legal owners  
(see Figure 8). Just over a fifth (21%, n=29) of 
non-restricted handguns were displaced to the illicit 
market by reactivating inadequately deactivated 
handguns. This difference in diversion methods  
for restricted and non-restricted handguns was 
significant (χ2=909.5 df=2 p<0.01).
Illicit link
Illicit link data refers to the criminal entity or activity  
in which the firearm was seized. Any firearm seizure 
from an individual or group involved in the illicit drug 
market and/or firearm trafficking, or associated with 
an organised criminal entity (such as OMCGs), was 
assigned to SOCG, based on the definition used by 
the ACC in compiling the NFTD. Other matters, such 
as seizures of firearms following an incident of violent 
crime, are assigned to SOCG or non-SOCG 
depending on the identity or activities of the 
individuals or entities involved. Illicit link data is not 
directly comparable between SOCG and non-SOCG.
There was a significant difference in the seizure 
circumstances for restricted long-arms compared 
with restricted handguns (χ2=365.7 df=2 p<.01). Of 
the 368 restricted long-arms recovered from SOCG, 
41 percent were seized from entities involved in 
Table 11 Illicit link for restricted long-arms and handgunsa
n %
Restricted long-arms
Firearm trafficking 150 41
Drug 125 34
OMCG 49 13
Violent crime 24 7
Firearm offences 12 3
Illegal import 2 1
Other 6 2
Total 368
Restricted handguns
Drug 165 39
Firearm trafficking 92 22
OMCG 89 21
Violent crime 40 9
Firearm offences 27 6
Illegal import 3 1
Other 11 3
Total 427
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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firearm trafficking, 34 percent from persons involved 
in the illicit drug market and 13 percent were seized 
from members of OMCGs (see Table 11). Less than 
10 percent were used in the commission of a violent 
crime. Restricted handguns were mostly seized from 
persons or groups involved in the illicit drug market. 
The proportion of handguns seized from persons 
involved in the drug market was almost double that 
seized from OMCGs (21%) and persons engaged in 
firearm trafficking ventures (22%).
Last known  
registration status
Detail on the last known registration status of a 
firearm, combined with data on the location of 
firearm recovery, can provide information on the 
transfer of firearms before they are recovered by law 
enforcement agencies. Pierce et al. (2004) used 
United States Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and 
Explosives data to do just this, although the data 
includes records of sales from dealers rather than 
registration status. In their analysis, Pierce et al. 
(2004) attempted to calculate:
•	 the proportion of recovered firearms that were  
still in the possession of the original purchaser;
•	 the location of first sale and recovery (evidence  
for jurisdiction transfer); and
•	 the length of time between first sale and recovery 
(time-to-crime).
Unfortunately, the absence until recently of a 
systematic method of recording Australian firearm 
imports and domestic sales/transfers and the 
mandatory registration of all firearms means the data 
collated on last known registration status not only 
contains a large number of unknown responses  
but may not always represent the actual last legal 
ownership of a firearm before it was diverted into  
the illicit market. The findings described below  
can therefore only suggest the possible point or 
penultimate point of diversion.
From the results presented in Tables 12 and 13, 
where information was recorded, the last known 
registration status for the majority of restricted 
long-arms and handguns was with an Australian 
dealer, either at import or registered as stock (65% 
and 56% respectively). By contrast, the last known 
registration status for non-restricted long-arms was 
comparably divided between Australian dealers 
(36%) and individual licence holders (39%). This was 
not the case for non-restricted handguns which, like 
restricted handguns, were more likely to have been 
Table 12 Last known registration status for restricted and non-restricted long-armsa
Restricted long-arms Non-restricted long-arms
n % n %
Australian dealer at import 140 53 124 26
Australia dealer stock 32 12 46 10
Australian individual licence 25 10 187 39
Local commercial manufacture 27 10 96 20
Other 9 3 6 1
Australia (all) 233 89 459 95
Overseas dealer 8 3 5 1
Overseas manufacture 18 7 15 3
Other 3 1 2 <1
Overseas (all) 29 11 22 5
Total 262 481
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Note: Excludes unknown=1,023 
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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last registered with an Australian dealer than a 
private owner (47% compared with 27%). It is difficult 
to determine whether these findings suggest there 
was a genuine risk of diversion of restricted firearms 
by some dealers or whether they are an artefact of 
previous issues with sales and registration records.
A difference also existed between long-arms and 
handguns in the site of the last registration, with a 
larger proportion of handguns having a last known 
registration with an overseas dealer or manufacturer. 
This was the case for both restricted and non-
restricted handguns.
Conclusion
The results presented here provide an indication of 
the make-up of the illicit firearm market and the suite 
of firearms held by SOCG and other consumers of 
illegal firearms. It is suggested by these findings that 
a combination of preference, availability and 
connections determines the composition of firearms 
accumulated.
A preference for restricted models
Not unexpectedly, a high proportion of firearms 
recovered from SOCG were restricted models— 
47 percent of all firearms retrieved from these groups 
were subject to either the 1996 or 2003 buybacks, 
compared with 34 percent of firearms recovered  
in non-SOCG circumstances. Restricted handguns 
were particularly prevalent. While handguns 
comprised 34 percent of all firearms seized, 
restricted handguns accounted for over half (54%) of 
all restricted firearms recovered. Overall, 65 percent 
of all handguns found in association with SOCG 
were restricted models, as were three-quarters of  
all semi-automatic pistols.
While the majority of firearms recovered from SOCG 
were in fact long-arms, the apparent preference for 
handguns is related to their favoured use, according 
to overseas research, as both a means of protection 
and in the commission of crime. Data on the use of 
firearms in the commission of violent crime indicates 
such a preference (eg Bricknell 2008b; Borzycki 
2008; Smith, Dossetor & Borzycki 2011; Smith & 
Louis 2010, 2009; although there has been a sharp 
drop in handgun-perpetrated homicides since 
2007–08: Chan & Payne (forthcoming); Dearden & 
Jones 2008). The types of handguns, especially the 
restricted models, recovered from SOCG have the 
dimensions and characteristics which most suit 
SOCG activities. Some semi-automatic pistols and 
revolvers with 2–3” barrels are concealable and 
easily carried, an important feature cited in interviews 
with criminal owners of handguns (eg see Blumstein 
Table 13 Last known registration status for restricted and non-restricted handgunsa
Restricted handguns Non-restricted handguns
n % n %
Australian dealer at import 23 11 18 11
Australia dealer stock 96 45 58 36
Australian individual licence 30 14 43 27
Other 9 4 14 9
Australia (all) 158 74 133 83
Overseas dealer 18 9 5 3
Overseas manufacture 33 16 20 12
Other 4 2 4 2
Overseas (all) 55 26 29 18
Total 213 162
a: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Note: Excludes unknown=582  
Source: ACC National Firearm Trace Database
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1995; Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006). Semi-
automatic pistols are additionally attractive because 
their magazines can be easily and quickly changed, 
and even concealable versions have large magazines 
capacities of some 10–13 rounds. Concealable 
revolvers generally have a smaller magazine 
cartridge capacity (6–5 rounds) and are difficult  
to reload quickly under stress, which makes them 
less attractive for use in confrontation episodes. It  
is concluded in the available literature that handguns 
are favoured by criminal gangs, or at least by those 
involved in particular criminal activities such as the 
illicit drugs market, primarily for self-defence and 
protection purposes (Blumstein 1995; Bricknell 
2008b; Cook et al. 2006; Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 
2006; Lizotte et al. 2000). Status is another 
influential factor, although this is more likely for 
younger or more impressionable gang members.
Long-arms recovered from SOCG were mostly less 
restricted Category A and B models (39%) but the 
proportion of highly restricted Category C and D 
models (22%) was much higher than is found  
among registered long-arms. Around a quarter of all 
SOCG-recovered firearms were Category A firearms 
and their significance here is probably attributable  
to the fact that this category of firearms is widely 
available and hence easily sourced. Category D 
firearms were of a similar proportion to Category B 
firearms (15% and 14% respectively) despite being  
a much less common item in the legal market.
Category C and D firearms tend not to be used in 
the commission of violent crime and related offences 
to the same extent as handguns, and their purchase 
by SOCG is unlikely to be related to the sorts of 
reasons for which handguns are acquired. Instead  
it is possible that Category C and D firearms—semi-
automatic rifles, semi-automatic shotguns, machine 
guns etc—are amassed partly due to the ‘attraction’ 
of owning highly lethal firearms but also to form a 
cache of firearms that can be drawn upon if and 
when there is a serious or rapid escalation in 
animosity between rival groups.
An interesting finding from the preliminary analysis 
was the difference in the relative proportion of 
restricted long-arms and handguns between SOCG 
and non-SOCG. It is assumed that criminal entities 
are more inclined to possess restricted firearms 
because they are perceived as the best tool to both 
protect assets and deter assault. Criminal entities 
are also much likelier to have established 
connections with, or operate within, groups that  
are involved in illicit firearm markets and hence have 
access to a wider selection of items. Restricted 
long-arms made up just over a third (36%) of all 
long-arms seized from SOCG but the proportion 
was significantly higher than that found for non-
SOCG seized long-arms (21%). This was not so for 
handguns. While the majority of restricted handguns 
were recovered from SOCG (ie 68%), the proportion 
of handguns seized from just SOCG that were a 
restricted model was the same as that proportion 
found for handguns retrieved from non-SOCG (ie 
just over two-thirds).
The high concentration of restricted handguns in  
the non-SOCG pool is probably the result of persons 
acquiring handguns to suit a curiosity rather than  
a criminal need. Regulations on handgun use have 
always been stricter than those for (most) long-arms, 
and handguns could only be obtained if a person 
was granted formal membership of a pistol club. 
Restricted models hence became a coveted item 
among enthusiasts who may have always wanted a 
handgun but could never legally obtain one (Project 
stakeholder personal communication 30 November 
2011). The difference then was that handguns  
were more freely ‘available’ than they are now,  
an availability that was facilitated by previous state 
laws regarding the definition and accountability of 
handguns.
Methods of diversion
In 2000 and 2001 respectively, amendments were 
made to the Weapons Act 1990 (Qld) and Firearms 
Act 1996 (NSW) to close loopholes which 
inadvertently facilitated the diversion of firearms  
into the illicit market. The Queensland deactivation 
loophole, described in the second section of this 
report, was ‘open’ for at least a decade and almost 
certainly led to the transfer of possibly thousands  
of handguns from the licit to the illicit market. The 
Police Powers and Responsibilities and Another Act 
Amendment Bill 2000 subsequently amended the 
definition of a firearm to include ‘any Category H 
weapon that is permanently inoperable’, introduced 
registration requirements for any Category H firearm 
(ie handgun) rendered inoperable and prescribed the 
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requirement that a collector’s licence be acquired if  
a person possesses a permanently inoperable 
Category H firearm.
The Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) as originally enacted 
required firearm barrels, but not frames or receivers, 
to be registered under Part 3 (Registration of 
Firearms) of the Act. The exemption of frames and 
receivers meant handguns without barrels could be 
sold without having to observe regulations on firearm 
disposal and frames/receivers could be purchased 
without need to register them. This opened up 
opportunities to convert or build up new handguns 
using non-registrable parts purchased in New South 
Wales with parts purchased elsewhere. Among the 
amendments prescribed in the Firearms Amendment 
(Trafficking) Act 2001 No 24 (NSW) was the 
stipulation that registration now ‘applies to every 
firearm frame and firearm receiver in the same way 
as it applies to a firearm’ (s 93(1)).
Long-arms, regardless of restricted status, were 
predominantly drawn from the grey market. 
Inconsistent inter-jurisdiction regulations on  
the registration of long-arms allowed a store of 
unregistered long-arms, including restricted models, 
to accrue well before the 1996 National Firearms 
Agreement. This grey market of firearms has thus 
served, and probably continues to serve, as a 
reliable and well-stocked resource for the illicit market.
The trafficking of illicit handguns has relied on 
alternative methods of transfer, influenced in part  
by the traditionally stricter controls on handgun 
ownership and use. The Queensland deactivation 
loophole almost certainly contributed to the 
trafficking of illicit handguns and while the NFTD 
data does not allow confirmation of this assumption, 
the significance of this category in the findings 
strongly suggests it played a substantial role. Other 
forms of diversion were apparently much less 
important, as was illicit domestic manufacture and 
illegal import. Theft, however, seems to have made a 
reliable contribution. It was the source for 50 percent 
of non-restricted handguns and 31 percent of 
restricted handguns. These results, however, must 
be interpreted with caution as the data on the 
source of illicit handguns was largely incomplete.
The contrasting role of deactivation in the diversion 
of restricted and non-restricted handguns probably 
reflects the efforts that would be taken to distribute  
a coveted item (ie a restricted form of semi-
automatic pistol). Theft is a risky enterprise but often 
an opportunistic one too; deactivation (and other 
complex forms of diversion) is more likely to be used 
for firearms of greater value and/or models that are 
in demand.
Data limitations
It is probable that the great majority of restricted 
handguns, like long-arms, were already in the illicit 
market well before the respective gun buybacks, but 
it is not clear whether this past supply has produced 
a pool of illicit firearms large enough to address 
current (or future) levels of demand. Reports in 
recent years of large-scale trafficking operations, 
alongside smaller, single-order transactions, indicate 
that additional supplementing, through illegal import, 
domestic manufacture and theft, has been 
occurring. To what extent recycling, rather than 
replenishing, characterises any of these operations, 
however, has not been considered; nor is data 
available to explore this matter further.
The analysis presented above describes the general 
characteristics of the illicit firearms market in 
Australia and how it has been sustained but it also 
reveals how dependent analysis of this type is on  
the availability of accurate, comprehensive data. It 
was possible with the available data to describe the 
composition of the illicit market, and the firearm 
preferences of serious and organised crime groups, 
but the validity of other findings, particularly around 
points of diversion, was affected by a substantial 
number of unknown responses. The poor quality  
of the recorded data also prevented any substantive 
comment on the contribution of illegal importation  
in supplying the market, potentially concealed 
information on diversion pathways for long-arms 
(with the grey market; being the de facto source 
assigned to most unregistered firearms); and 
precluded reliable identification of last legal 
ownership of illicit firearms. These deficiencies were 
not a problem of the dataset itself but rather an 
illustration of the deficiencies in the documentation 
of key firearm transactions, an issue affecting the 
tracing of firearms that is discussed in the next section.
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Firearm tracing, in its broadest sense, refers to the 
tracking of a firearm from ‘cradle to grave’—that  
is, from manufacture to (its eventual) deactivation, 
destruction or legal export. In this scenario, a firearm 
is traced from its source through ‘different points  
in its line of supply’ to its eventual removal from  
the registration record. The trace line shows the 
passage of transfer between manufacturer, 
importer(s), dealers, owners and (if it occurs) police 
possession. If methodically followed, this process 
improves the likelihood of identifying the site of 
diversion if the firearm is transferred into the illicit 
market. This represents the ideal for authorities 
engaged in firearm regulation and control but an 
ideal that has proved difficult to realise.
The preventative provisions outlined in the UN 
Protocol incorporate action to prevent the illicit 
transfer of firearms, their parts and components and 
ammunition across state borders, but some of the 
measures serve domestic agendas too. Of particular 
pertinence to Australia is the management and 
exchange of information on firearms that, along  
with the application of unique identification marks, is 
fundamental to firearm tracing. This section reviews 
the current status of firearms information management 
in Australia and where improvements in the collation 
and sharing of this information could occur.
The problem with data
Issues around quality, consistency and 
standardisation of data are certainly not unique to 
the collation of information on firearms. The quality of 
the data used for the analysis, which was dependent 
on the recording of consistent data from different 
agencies, and subsequent discussions with project 
stakeholders have shown this to be the case.  
The tracing of firearms in Australia has been 
compromised by two factors—a general absence  
of historical data and issues around current standard 
data collection procedures, information sharing and 
resources. These factors have restricted the scope 
of the analysis that could be achieved for this study.
There are numerous reservoirs of primary firearms 
data in Australia. These include:
•	 state and territory police firearm registers;
•	 material inventories, ballistic library inventories and 
record systems of firearms in police possession  
(ie firearms surrendered to, seized by or otherwise 
appropriated by police) administered by police 
services;
•	 the Integrated Cargo System, Firearms Tracking 
System and Detained Goods Management 
System administered by ACBPS;
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•	 the Defence Export Control System administered 
by the Defence Export Control Office. This Office 
controls the export of firearms and ammunition 
through the issuance of permits and licences,  
and import of firearms under Regulation 13E of 
the Customs (Prohibited Exports) Regulations 
1956 (Cth); and
•	 the Attorney-General’s Department Firearm Policy 
Unit, which manages applications for the 
importation of certain firearms prescribed under 
Regulation 4F of the Customs (Prohibited Import) 
Regulations 1956 (Cth).
At the most fundamental level is the data collected 
by state and territory police firearm registries. 
Firearm registers compile information on licensed 
firearm owners and dealers and the firearms 
registered to them. As discussed earlier, only 
handguns were subject to compulsory registration  
in Australia before the period of firearm reforms 
described earlier, and not every state and territory 
required registration of long-arms. The absence of  
a nationwide registration system for long-arms 
contributed to the phenomenon of the grey market, 
or the assemblage of long-arms that sit outside the 
legal pool that, and while not necessarily used or 
owned by persons involved in criminal activity, can 
and do flow into the illicit market. These firearms are 
effectively untraceable—records might exist on their 
place of manufacture and/or year of import and  
the circumstances of their seizure (if recovered  
by police), but documentation on the transfer of 
ownership between these two ‘life markers’ is often 
missing. It is for this reason that the pattern of 
long-arm diversion in Australia tends to be opaque, 
as shown in the analysis section where the majority 
of seized long-arms were denoted as originating 
from the grey market. Compulsory handgun 
registration does provide for better historical data 
and hence contributed to better delineation of 
sources regarding common points of diversion. The 
large amount of unknown or missing data, however, 
indicates underlying problems with data gathering 
and recording.
Among the resolutions from the National Firearms 
Agreement (1996) was the establishment of an 
integrated licence and firearm registration system  
in all jurisdictions. All states and territories adopted 
or modified their systems to incorporate a licensing 
scheme for persons to possess/use firearms and a 
registration scheme for firearms. Western Australia 
implemented a system different to other jurisdictions 
whereby the register is a record of firearm licences, 
permits and approvals, rather than a register of 
firearms per se. The licence details particulars about 
the licence owner and the types of firearms owned 
by the licence holder, which are then recorded in the 
register.
Together with the implementation of nationwide 
registration of all firearms was the recommendation 
that state and territory firearm registers be linked  
to enable the exchange of information. The original 
model for information exchange, still in operation,  
is the NFLRS, which is administered by CrimTrac. 
NFLRS stores data on registered, lost, stolen and 
destroyed firearms, licence holders and licensed 
firearm dealers and can be linked to other CrimTrac-
administered police reference systems. The data on 
the system, however, is not complete and there are 
problems with misclassified and miscoded records 
originating from police registers (Project stakeholders 
personal communication  
28 November 2011).
The ultimate goal is the implementation of an 
integrated national firearms licensing and registration 
(or national firearms management) system that 
would allow information on firearms to be 
electronically transferred between jurisdictions.  
The primary purpose of such a system is two-fold—
to facilitate law enforcement agencies’ capability  
in tracing the movement of firearms throughout 
Australia and to streamline existing licensing 
processes for firearm owners. At its simplest,  
the system would allow state and territory firearm 
registers to ‘communicate’ (particularly important for 
reconciling inter-jurisdictional movements of firearms, 
which has been the cause of, or method for, 
diversion) but could incorporate links to other 
government firearm data resources. Two studies 
have already examined the logistics of establishing  
a NFMS but a final product has yet to materialise.
Historical data shortcomings are likely affected by 
‘weaker’ firearm laws and past ambivalence to 
recording firearm movements, compounded by 
technological limitations in the documentation of 
large amounts of data. In more recent decades, or  
at least since the firearm reforms, impetus and 
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(presumably) technological capacity have both been 
present to produce better records on firearms. A 
case in point was the absence in the ACBPS of a 
centralised electronic recording system for firearms 
data and the changes made since the early 2000s  
to improve the consolidation of this information. In 
2002, the ACBPS first started recording the serial 
numbers (and other firearm markers) of all handguns 
released from ACBPS custody (as part of the 
Category H Handgun Certification Scheme). This 
was followed by the introduction in April 2006 of  
the Detained Goods Management System, which 
allowed for the capture of serial numbers from all 
detained firearms into the one centralised database. 
The firearms that were now being recorded in the 
Detained Goods Management System accounted 
for the vast majority of firearms legally imported into 
Australia, such as those contained in commercial 
shipments and firearms that required safety testing 
on entry into the country. In response to a 2008 
resolution from the then Ministerial Council for Police 
and Emergency Management Police around  
the collection and dissemination of firearm data,  
the ACBPS commenced the third phase in its 
consolidation of firearm data by recording 
information (including serial numbers) on all legally 
imported firearms. Starting from 1 January 2009,  
the ACBPS began recording serial numbers from  
all legally imported firearms, including those firearms 
entering Australia that had not been previously 
detained due to importers not having the relevant 
documentation with them at the time of import  
because they were not subject to safety training 
testing requirements. These firearms were typically 
‘accompanied firearms’ that were entering Australia 
through the passenger stream.
Yet to achieve a consolidated record of firearms data, 
such as envisaged for a NFMS, that would permit 
straightforward firearm tracing, some fundamental 
processes are still in need of mastering. Many  
of these are specific to the recording of firearm 
information at the registry level, but the fundamentals 
of technical expertise and improved data recording 
practices extend to the maintenance of firearms  
data in a number of the other listed data systems, 
particularly with regard to import and export, seizure/
recovery, ballistics and firearm disposal records.
Achieving the fundamentals 
of firearm data recording
First capture recording of firearm 
identification and other features
A critical fundamental in producing data suitable  
for tracing is the accurate recording of a firearm’s 
identification marker—the serial number—and other 
classifying features (eg make, model). Previous 
audits of serial number data have returned high error 
rates (Project stakeholder personal communication 
30 November 2011), including evidence for high 
duplication rates. Data on other classifying features 
of recorded firearms (eg make, model, calibre) have 
been similarly compromised, although this is not as 
much a problem as incorrect serial numbers.
Firearm identification is highly technical and requires 
considerable proficiency and knowledge. The 
technical nature of firearm identification creates  
the risk (and the reality) that personnel, such as  
staff in firearm registries, may not always have  
the knowledge or training to accurately record  
the features that are vital to identifying individual 
firearms. The quality of recorded serial number data 
is particularly affected—serial numbers, depending 
on the make of a firearm, can be located on different 
components of the firearm and their visibility is  
not always obvious. Some firearms may also have 
multiple stamps or have been poorly stamped, thus 
rendering the serial number difficult to distinguish, 
but these anomalies may not be (or cannot be) 
noted. A lack of expertise in identifying or locating 
the serial number may result in an incorrect serial 
number entry—an erroneous ‘nil visible’ record, the 
model number recorded instead, or a modified or 
truncated version of the full serial number. Additional 
information regarding the location of the serial 
number is additionally pertinent, particularly where a 
serial number is located on a firearm component that 
is not accountable under firearm legislation (eg a 
slide versus a frame).
Serial numbers, while the most important firearm 
identifying marker, are not 100 percent unique  
and hence it is equally important other identifying 
features—make, model, calibre, action—are also 
captured correctly. An accurate record of these 
features is particularly useful if a firearm returns to 
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police attention and the serial number has been 
defaced. Again, technical expertise is often 
necessary to properly identify or recognise these 
additional markers.
A further complicating factor relates to the initial 
capture of firearm data. In firearm registries, this is 
often in handwritten format, on registration forms 
completed by licensed owners. This carries the 
additional risk of inaccurate data being recorded  
if there is a misinterpretation or misreading of 
handwritten entries, or the provision of misspelt  
or otherwise inaccurate information.
Comprehensive training in firearm identification is  
an obvious response to rectify inaccurate recording 
practices and ideally would extend to all personnel 
responsible for extracting identification material from 
firearms. Training is a resource issue and outside 
crucial roles, such as in ballistics, might not always 
be feasible. One method being used in firearm 
ballistics is to compile digital images of firearms for 
examination, but this is not a practicable option in 
other data recording contexts, not least because 
electronic filing would be unmanageable. Instead, 
other measures need to be applied that assist in 
self-correcting and/or standardising identification 
material, as discussed below.
Data standards
A further, exacerbating factor in the collation of 
consistent, quality firearm data is a lack of data 
standardisation. Different systems are operated 
across the states and territories, a few of which  
have been upgraded or replaced in recent years. 
Resource issues do not always permit regular, 
methodical data cleaning (which systems may 
benefit from) and hence first-level data entry is a 
crucial step in maintaining accurate records. Data 
entry systems relying on free text fields and no 
autocorrect function can (and do) produce multiple 
variations of the same classifier item (eg calibre) and 
the structure by which serial numbers are entered. 
Some of this inaccuracy may originate in the 
technical competency of the original recorder, but  
it is also created by human error in data entry and  
a lack of consistency produced by multiple data 
entrants.
The creation of standardised templates (at least  
for important classifier data items), and filtering 
functions that validate item combinations and force 
prompts that constrain the length, type and format 
of alphanumeric entries would have two practical 
effects. First, it can prevent and correct inaccurate  
or incorrect items produced by typical data entry 
mistakes and potentially prevent the entry of 
misidentified items. Actual autocorrection in the latter 
situation is really only viable for classifiers such as 
make, model and action but potentially could flag, 
where other information is correct, problems with  
the configuration of the serial number. A number  
of firearm register systems already employ these 
functions, such as filtering, and the use of drop-
down or standardised templates. Victoria Police 
have developed a series of standardised 
templates—the Weapon Identification System, or 
WIDS—that are available on their website to assist 
firearm owners to correctly identify their firearm. 
Verification searches can be undertaken if the owner 
knows the make or model of their firearm and 
retrieve information on other firearm characteristics. 
For example, if the owner knows their firearm has  
a model name of ‘700 Special’ the system retrieves 
the related template, which determines the firearm 
type (handgun), firearm category (‘H’), firearm make 
(‘Astra’), action (‘semi-automatic’) and calibre 
variants (.32AUTO) associated with that model type.
The current standard of jurisdictional firearm data, 
however, creates difficulty in trying to link a particular 
firearm record to the data stored within any firearm 
identification system. Until the existing data is 
subject to manual preliminary cleansing, the 
correlation of existing records to preferred 
identification standards will remain a problem.  
Once a preliminary cleansing has taken place then 
the preferred data standards may be further applied.
Removing the data gaps
The problem of the quality, consistency and 
standardisation of data collected for registration and 
evidentiary purposes is not a new one; nor are the 
remedies proposed to improve the quality of firearms 
data. These remedies, however, are not options that 
can be achieved quickly or without considerable 
financial investment, and jurisdictions and bodies 
such as the Firearm and Weapons Policy Working 
Group continue to make and consider methods of 
improvement.
52 Firearm trafficking and serious and organised crime gangs
An evident and important outcome of improving data 
quality is the elimination of data gaps, the next step 
in achieving the goal of tracing the life course of a 
firearm. Data gaps are created and sustained by 
dirty data and incomplete or unconnected systems 
of information exchange. The NFLRS was 
established as a national database to support 
information exchange on all registered firearms and 
licensed owners. It is used by firearm registries to 
upload new records and is available to registry staff 
and operational police to conduct record searches. 
An alternative or replacement to NFLRS has 
received consideration in past years, based on the 
creation of a single shared ‘authoritative identity 
record’ for each individual firearm, and onto which 
updates in its movement between custodians is 
documented. Key entry-into-the-system or transfer 
flags would include import or export, sale, inter-
jurisdictional transfer, theft or loss, surrender, seizure, 
recovery, deactivation and destruction events.  
This deceptively simple premise, however, was 
determined, in the model proposed, to require 
substantial investment. The status quo was hence 
retained, albeit with incremental improvements in 
data quality assurances at the jurisdictional level and 
alternative approaches to better document and alert 
incoming jurisdictions of the transfer of firearms, an 
event known to be associated with an increased risk 
of firearms being lost to the system.
Stakeholders for this project suggested that an 
information-sharing scheme founded on linked 
records still represented the ideal solution to 
safeguard accurate data and minimise the 
emergence of data gaps. One option would be  
a simplified version of previously recommended 
products comprising a distributed database with 
single records for firearm and licensed owners. 
Jurisdictions would retain custodianship of their  
data but maintain communication with each other 
through a data linkage system based on firearm and 
licensed owner records. The specifics of a linkage 
system require further exploration that cannot be 
accommodated in this report but would necessitate 
adaptation to a common ontology for the 
classification of firearms. The importance of such  
a common ontology has featured in broader 
discussions by the Firearm and Weapons Policy 
Working Group on the development and instalment 
of a National Firearms Identification Database.
To resolve the suitability of a distributed database, 
stakeholders in the project further suggested the 
possibility of conducting a limited-scale study 
involving two jurisdictions (1 large, 1 small) to 
estimate the cost of integrating to a data linkage 
system. An important component of the study would 
be for participating jurisdictions to determine what  
is being lost (in time, resources and efficiency) with 
their current system and what might be gained 
through integration. If integration does prove to  
be the more efficient approach, it would help 
promote the creation of better, more consistent  
data. Efficiency in data collation and dissemination 
would also assist in freeing up crucial resources for 
additional compliance monitoring and auditing work.
Conclusion
Past practices, as evidenced by the data collated in 
the NFTD and discussion with project stakeholders, 
have resulted in certain data useful or critical to the 
tracing of firearms being captured only recently (such 
as serial number data on import and registered 
long-arms), being captured inconsistently or not 
being captured at all. Incomplete or incompatible 
data hamper (or potentially render impossible) the 
back-capture of information. At a minimum, it 
prevents more sophisticated analyses of firearm 
markets and adds qualifiers to the strength of the 
findings discussed earlier. At a more critical level  
it potentially impedes law enforcement agencies  
to reconcile firearms data during different stages of  
a firearm’s history. Yet when done well, it can help 
prevent or at least flag where firearms have been lost 
to the system and disrupt the flow of firearms into 
the illicit market.
Important steps have been made in the collection  
of firearm data, compelled by inter-governmental 
and domestic policies, enabled by technological 
capabilities and encouraged by genuine need to 
trace firearms. Further steps in standardising and 
harmonising data on a national level are still needed, 
although these steps are still being explored, with 
the dual purpose of ensuring that the logistics of 
application are achievable. If complemented with  
a system that supports cross-jurisdictional and 
cross-agency data transmission or access, and 
training of personnel in the accurate recording of 
firearms information, the compilation of Australian 
firearm data will be of a quality that promotes the 
efficient tracing of firearms and, consequently, a 
targeted enforcement response.
53Conclusion
elevated to items of choice because they have 
features regarded as essential or preferential for  
the offensive, defensive and symbolic purposes for 
which they are acquired (Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 
2006). Long-arms and handguns that were subject 
to the gun and pistol buybacks that accompanied 
the major firearms agreements comprised almost 
half (47%) of all firearms seized from SOCG. Other 
handguns not subject to the pistol buyback, but still 
restricted under Australian laws, made up another 
15 percent of seized firearms from SOCG. The 
majority of these restricted firearms were semi-
automatic rifles and semi-automatic pistols, 
supplemented by smaller quantities of pump-action 
shotguns, revolvers, semi-automatic shotguns, 
submachine guns and single shot pistols. The 
predominance of restricted long-arms and handguns 
among SOCG is not just a function of preference but 
is almost certainly connected to contacts within the 
illicit market.
The types of handgun recovered from SOCG, 
particularly among OMCGs, likely represent the ideal 
weapon as they are concealable, transportable, and 
have magazines that are easily and quickly changed 
and (for some models) capable of firing 10–13 
rounds. Research from England and Wales and the 
United States shows the dominance of handgun 
ownership among participants in the manufacture, 
distribution and sale of illicit drugs (Blumstein 1995; 
The complexity of illicit firearm markets has 
hampered abilities to predict and disrupt supply.  
It has also led to conjecture about the sources  
and mechanics of the market that without 
comprehensive analysis has been difficult to 
substantiate or refute. The nature of this report 
prevents the use of closed source information that 
would have assisted in drawing out some of the less 
well understood (or less publicised) facilitators of  
the market and allowed confirmation of trafficking 
operations that are described here. Further, the 
nature and quality of the available information has 
additionally influenced how much can be revealed 
about market composition and supply and its 
relationship with organised crime. Nevertheless, this 
research has achieved two constructive goals. First, 
it has described the likely composition of the market, 
specifically the preferences for restricted long-arms 
and handguns by SOCG and suggested the mix  
of deliberate and fortuitous diversion pathways 
exploited to obtain these firearms. Second, it has 
highlighted where irregularities in documenting 
firearm transfer has potentially concealed the point 
or time at which firearms have left the legal market.
The quantity of restricted long-arms and handguns 
found among seized illicit firearms is not unexpected. 
Australia’s strict firearm laws permit only controlled 
access to handguns; automatic and semi-automatic 
long-arms, and restricted models are commonly 
Conclusion
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Cook et al. 2006; Hales, Lewis & Silverstone 2006; 
Lizotte et al. 2000; Wright & Rossi 1994) and this 
association was found here too—around four in  
10 restricted handguns were seized from entities 
involved in the illicit drugs market.
Restricted long-arms were found to be less common 
than restricted handguns but, again, predominantly 
connected to SOCG. The function of such firearms 
is arguably not as recognisable as handguns, at 
least in relation to their portability and practicality. 
Their acquisition is possibly more closely related  
to the attraction of owning highly powered, high-
capacity and highly lethal items. Hales, Lewis and 
Silverstone (2006: 55) cited symbolism, along with 
‘overwhelming power’ and ‘indiscriminate aim’ as 
features that attracted certain gang members to 
automatic firearms (these firearms included both 
long-arms and handguns), although they noted that 
this appeal did not extend to the majority of persons 
interviewed. The cost and impracticality of operating 
such firearms were nominated as dissuading factors. 
Restricted long-arms, then, are possibly acquired 
largely for defensive purposes, stockpiled in arsenals 
for use when rivalry or hostility intensifies between 
two competing groups. However, 41 percent of 
SOCG restricted long-arms were possessed at the 
time of seizure for the purposes of being trafficked, 
indicating that the ultimate destination or use of 
these long-arms is not immediately apparent.
The consumers of illicit firearms are not, of course, 
exclusively criminal entities involved in serious and 
organised crime. Over 1,000 of the firearms included 
in the analysis were seized from non-SOCG 
individuals. The circumstances of seizures of 
non-SOCG firearms were largely denoted as the 
commission of firearm offences, and although 
information on the offender status of the individual 
prior to the seizure was not contained within the 
data, it was assumed that the acquisition of firearms 
by non-SOCG persons was for reasons or purposes 
different to those for SOCG acquisitions. 
Nonetheless, restricted handguns seizures from 
non-SOCG were proportionally the same as SOCG 
handgun seizures, indicating a similar proclivity for 
concealable, higher powered handguns. Historically 
stricter provisions for handgun ownership, coupled 
with further tightening of laws post-reforms, has 
likely augmented the attraction of restricted 
handguns, and enthusiasts may have needed to 
consult with suppliers from the illicit market to obtain 
these items.
The conduits of supply to the illicit market are better 
differentiated for handguns than they are for 
long-arms, but the quality of data used to identify 
these supply routes, in particular the very high 
‘unknown’ response rate for handguns, 
compromises the strength of these findings. The 
‘grey market’ has and likely continues to be a 
legitimate source of long-arms to the illicit market, 
but this all-capturing reservoir that emerged 
post-1996 conceivably masks some diversion 
events. Most of the seized long-arms, irrespective of 
restricted status, were recorded as having originated 
in the grey market, with a much smaller percentage 
being stolen items. Theft appears to have made a 
much more substantial contribution to the supply  
of illicit handguns and the ‘deactivation loophole’ 
described earlier was identified (where information 
was available) as the source of 70 percent of 
restricted handguns and 71 percent of non-
restricted handguns seized by police.
These data give an indication of historically important 
supply routes (the deactivation loophole being a 
relevant example), but are less reliable in predicting 
future patterns of supply. Further, the limitations of 
the data should be noted as they provide important 
qualification to some of the findings. The question  
of illegal importation is a case in point. Illegal 
importation has been touted (by some) as a critical 
source for illicit firearms, but the analysis suggests  
it has made an apparently minor contribution. 
However, additional variables on the legal status of 
importation could not be used to further investigate 
the proportion of seized firearms that were legally  
or illegally imported into the country, and hence be 
used to help corroborate the findings from the 
analysis.
Along with questions about the contribution of illegal 
importation to the illicit market is how much 
contribution ‘domestic leakage’ is making at present 
and will make into the future. There have been a 
small number of publicised cases of illicit domestic 
manufacture in the last decade, with the majority of 
illegal industries producing prohibited models. The 
analysis showed that illegally manufactured firearms 
comprised around eight to 11 percent of seized 
handguns (although mostly pen guns) and two 
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percent for restricted long-arms. The direction  
of scale of activity, however, is difficult to predict.  
The risk of detection has probably meant most 
manufacturing operations are small, made-to-order 
ventures and this model of operation may continue 
into the immediate future. Other common forms  
of domestic leakage are the theft of legal firearms 
and dealer diversion. Data from the AIC’s National 
Firearm Theft Monitoring Program found an average 
of almost 1,500 firearms were reported stolen and 
hence entering the illicit market between 2004–05 
and 2008–09. The great majority of these firearms 
were not models commonly acquired by SOCG but 
they still made up around 30 percent of all firearms 
seized from SOCG and a larger proportion for 
non-SOCG. The National Firearm Theft Monitoring 
Program data does not enable definitive identification 
of targeted thefts, but incident narrative indicated 
where targeting was suspected, usually associated 
with multiple thefts, thefts from transport or courier 
companies and armed robberies of security guards. 
The largest theft incident from this period was the 
theft of 55 firearms, mostly handguns, from a firearm 
dealer in Queensland.
The involvement of some corrupt firearm dealers in 
furnishing the illicit market is established, but more 
conclusive information on the manner of involvement 
sits outside open-source material. Dealers were 
instrumental players in the exploitation of the 
deactivation loophole that facilitated the inflow of 
reportedly thousands of handguns into the illicit 
market and in other large-scale diversion ventures 
such as the ‘Starlight’ operation in South Australia. 
Outside deactivation, dealer-related diversion was 
responsible for a small number of the seized firearms 
recorded in the analysis data, largely enacted 
through the provision of false information to disguise 
inter-state transfers or receipt and disposal of items, 
or the staging of false exports.
While these analyses establish some specifics on the 
supply to, and composition and consumption of, the 
illicit firearms market, issues of data quality and the 
strength of some of the findings from the analysis 
emphasise the need for standardised records on 
firearms to be developed. Before the firearm reforms, 
records on firearm import, sales, transfer of 
ownership and disposal were not systematically 
collected. For example, documentation of serial 
numbers on imported firearms did not occur until 
2001 for handguns and 2006 for long-arms; many 
jurisdictions did not require the registration of 
long-arms, and interstate transfer of firearms were 
not always followed up by the jurisdiction of 
departure or receipt. These and other factors, such 
as a lack of standardised data-recording procedures 
and a lack of technical expertise in recording firearm 
characteristics, have produced data that can only 
support to an extent the tracing of firearms.
The suggestions made in the previous section  
about improving first capture recording of firearms 
identification features, such as the critically important 
serial number, standardisation of data entry fields 
and the creation, at the very least, of data linkages 
between firearm record systems are not new. The 
ideal of a fully integrated data system, as envisaged 
in the National Firearms Agreement (1996), has been 
explored but it is not yet realised. Small, incremental 
steps, including a commitment to upgrade technical 
expertise, create common ontologies and generate 
additional platforms for information exchange will 
assist in the momentum to develop data in a format 
and a level of completeness suitable to delivering the 
‘cradle to grave’ benchmark crucial for accurately 
tracing firearms. It will also assist in a better 
understanding of the mechanics of the illicit market, 
and hence methods to combat its supply, by 
signposting preferences in items and the common 
and newly exploited modes of transference.
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Despite strict regulations on the import, export, ownership, use, transfer and storage  
of licit firearms, there exists in Australia a potentially large pool of illicit firearms, some  
of which are acquired, stockpiled and used for serious and organised crime. This report 
follows a modest group of publicly released examinations of firearm trafficking operations 
in Australia, to describe what can be determined about the composition and maintenance 
of the illicit firearm market, its use by serious and organised crime groups and the diversity 
of transaction arrangements used to vend illicit firearms.
